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Analyses of the viability of biofuels as alternatives to fossil fuels have
often adopted a technocratic approach that focuses on environmental
consequences, but places less emphasis on the impact that biofuels may have
on vulnerable populations. This Article fills the gap in the existing literature
by evaluating biofuels through the lens of environmental justice - including
climate justice and food justice. The Article examines the impact of biofuels
on the global food system and on the planet's most food-insecure
populations. It concludes that the laws and policies promoting the
cultivation of biofuels have contributed to global malnourishment by raising
food prices and accelerating the large-scale acquisition of arable lands in
poor countries that deprive local communities of the land and water
necessary to grow food (a phenomenon known as land-grabbing).
Ironically, the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of many biofuels exceed
those of the fossil fuels they replace. Instead of mitigating climate change,
the promotion of biofuels threatens to intensify an industrial model of
agricultural production that degrades local ecosystems, exacerbates climate
change, and intensifies food insecurity. The Article concludes by discussing
governance strategies to foster a more equitable and sustainable approach
to bioenergy that respects, protects, and fulfills the human right to food.
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INTRODUCTION
Replacing fossil fuels with biofuels produced from renewable organic
matter promises to mitigate climate change, diminish dependence on foreign
energy sources, and promote economic development in the countries that
produce the crops used as biofuel feedstocks.I While a growing body of
legal scholarship questions these projections and proposes strategies to
regulate the environmental and social impacts of bioenergy, the debates
over biofuels rarely address the environmental justice implications of this
*Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. The author would like to thank Sheila
Foster and Randall Abate for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1 See JAMES SMITH, BIOFUELS AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF RISK 93 (2010); Brian Tokar,
Biofuels and the Global Food Crisis, in AGRICULTURE AND FOOD IN CRISIS: CONFLICT,
RESISTANCE, AND RENEWAL (Fred Magdoff & Brian Tokar eds., 2010).
2 See, e.g., Adam Christensen & Connie Lausten, Fundamental Inconsistencies Between
Federal Biofuels Policy and Their Implications, 44 ENVTL L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10395
(2014); Daniel A. Farber, Indirect Land Use Change, Uncertainty, and Biofuels Policy, 2011
U. ILL. L. REv. 381 (2011); David Zilberman et al., On the Inclusion of Indirect Land Use in
Biofuel Regulations, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 413 (2011); Madhu Khanna et al., Land Use and
Greenhouse Gas Mitigation Effects of Biofuel Policies, 2011 U. ILL. L. Rv. 549 (2011);
Danielle Spiegel Feld, Ensuring that Imported Biofuels Abide by Domestic Environmental
Standards: Will the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade Tolerate Asymmetrical
Compliance Regimes?, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 79 (2011); Jody M. Endres, Clearing the Air:
The Meta-Standard Approach to Ensuring Biofuels Environmental and Social Sustainability,
27 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 73 (2010); Richard L. Ottinger & Steven E. Miller, Bioenergy in
Developing Countries: Potential and Risks, 1 RENEWABLE ENERGY L. & POL'Y REv. 23
(2010); Richard L. Ottinger, Biofuels-Potential, Problems & Solutions, 19 FORDHAM ENVTL.
L. REv. 253 (2009).
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technology.3 Questions that remain include: Will efforts to mitigate climate
change by promoting biofuels exacerbate the chronic undernourishment that
currently afflicts millions of people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America? Or
are there win-win solutions that will simultaneously reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and enhance the livelihoods of the poor?
This Article seeks to fill the gap in the existing literature by analyzing
biofuels through the lens of human rights and environmental justice. It
examines the relationship between biofuels production and the global food
system, analyzes the disparate impact of biofuels production on the planet's
most food-insecure populations, and recommends governance strategies to
respect, protect, and fulfill the fundamental human right to food.
This Article argues that the biofuel policies of the United States and the
European Union have violated the right to food of vulnerable communities
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America by increasing food prices and stimulating
large-scale land transactions that deprive local communities of the land and
water necessary to grow food. Far from mitigating climate change, these
biofuel policies accelerate the worldwide transition to fossil-fuel-based
industrial agriculture that emits prodigious quantities of greenhouse gases,
degrades local ecosystems, and favors export-oriented corporate agribusiness
at the expense of small farmers and local food production. Because the life
cycle greenhouse gas emissions of many biofuels exceed those of fossil
fuels, the climate change benefits of these biofuels are illusory. Biofuels
also reinforce the car-dependent and energy-intensive lifestyles in affluent
and middle-income countries that perpetuate climate change instead of
fostering more environmentally friendly transportation options, such as
public transit, bicycling, and car sharing.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I defines environmental justice
and explains its relevance to food production and consumption. Part II
provides a critical assessment of the global food system and argues that
biofuels represent a continuation of pre-existing patterns of trade and
production that have generated chronic undernourishment among large
segments of the world's population. Part III discusses some of the legal and
policy reforms required to promote an equitable and sustainable approach to
bioenergy.
3 See, e.g., Stewart Fast, The Biofuels Debate: Searching for the Role of Environmental
Justice in Environmental Discourse, 37 ENVIRONMENTS J. 83 (2009) (finding that the
paradigm of environmental justice is invoked infrequently in the debate over biofuels).
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, FOOD, AND CLIMATE: EXPLORING THE
LINKAGES
Environmental justice is both a social movement and a paradigm
through which to evaluate laws, policies, and practices that have an impact
on the environment and on vulnerable populations.4  The environmental
justice movement arose in the United States in the 1980s in response to the
disparate concentration of polluting facilities and abandoned hazardous
waste sites in low-income communities of color.5 In subsequent decades,
grassroots environmental movements in both affluent and poor nations
deployed the language of environmental justice in a wide variety of
environmental struggles, including efforts to secure equitable access to food,
water, land, and energy as well as campaigns to halt ecologically devastating
projects, such as hydroelectric dams, mines, and oil and gas development.
6
Environmental justice scholars and activists have emphasized four
distinct aspects of environmental justice: distributive justice, procedural
justice, corrective justice, and social justice.7 First, environmental justice is
premised on the equitable distribution of the benefits and burdens of
economic activity as well as equitable access to environmental amenities and
necessities, such as parks, open space, clean air, clean water, and safe and
4 For an introduction to environmental justice theories and movements, see generally
Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, Human Rights and the Global South, 13 SANTA
CLARA J. INT'L L. 151 (2015); HENRY SHUE, CLIMATE JUSTICE: VULNERABILITY AND
PROTECTION (2014); RHUKs TEMITOPE AKO, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 1N DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES: PERSPECTIVES FROM AFRICA AND ASIA-PACIFIC (2013); Carmen G. Gonzalez,
Environmental Justice and International Environmental Law, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 77 (Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2013); GORDON
WALKER, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: CONCEPTS, EVIDENCE AND POLITICS (2012);
ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUALITY BEYOND BORDERS: LOCAL PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL
INJUSTICES (JoAnn Carmin & Julian Agyeman eds., 2011); DAvID SCHLOSBERG, DEFINING
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES, MOVEMENTS, AND NATURE (2009); ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEXT (Jonas Ebbeson & Phoebe Okowa eds., 2009);
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA: PROBLEMS, PROMISE, AND PRACTICE (David V.
Carruthers ed. 2008); THE QUEST FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE
POLITICS OF POLLUTION (Robert D. Bullard ed., 2005).
5 See LUKE W. COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL
RACISM AND THE RISE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT 19-33 (2001).
6 See Joan Martinez-Alier et al., Between Activism and Science: Grassroots Concepts for
Sustainability Coined by Environmental Justice Organizations, 21 J. OF POL. ECOLOGY 19, 27-
42 (2014).
7 See generally Robert R. Kuehn, A Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL L. REP.
10681 (2000).
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nutritious food.8 Second, environmental justice involves procedural fairness,
including the right of all communities to participate in governmental
decision making related to the environment.9 Third, environmental justice
requires governments to enforce environmental statutes and regulations and
to provide compensation to those whose rights are violated.10  Finally,
environmental justice is inextricably intertwined with other forms of social
and economic justice and cannot be attained without combating related
social ills, such as poverty and racism.11 From the founding of the United
States to the present, race has played a key role in determining which
communities can and should have access to wild lands and natural spaces,
and which communities are relegated to waste-handling occupations and
targeted by waste disposal and other polluting industries.12  In order to
address environmental injustice, it is necessary to examine how race and
class dynamics influence environmental quality and to recognize that
disadvantaged communities do not compartmentalize environmental
inequities and other social problems.
13
Environmental justice has an important international dimension that
provides valuable insights into environmental conflicts between affluent
8 See id. at 10683-88; Gonzalez, Environmental Justice and International Environmental
Law, supra note 4, at 78; Duncan French, Sustainable Development and the Instinctive
Imperative of Justice in the Global Order, in GLOBAL JUSTICE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 3 (Duncan French ed., 2010).
9 See Kuehn, supra note 7 at 10688-92; Carmen G. Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, and
Malnutrition: Agricultural Trade Policy Through an Environmental Justice Lens, 14 MICH.
ST. J. INT'L L. 345, 34849 (2006).
10 See Kuehn, supra note 7, at 10693-98; Gonzalez, Environmental Justice and
International Environmental Law, supra note 4, at 85-87 (explaining how environmental
justice is grounded in human rights).
11 See Kuehn, supra note 7, at 10698-10702.
12 See CARL A. ZIMRING, CLEAN AND WHITE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM IN
THE UNITED STATES (2015) (explaining how deeply-rooted notions of race and hygiene
perpetuated workplace and residential segregation and relegated people of color to waste-
handling occupations and polluted neighborhoods); CAROLYN FINNEY, BLACK FACES, WHITE
SPACES: REIMAGINING THE RELATIONSHIP OF AFRiCAN-AMERICANS TO THE GREAT OUTDOORS
(2014) (examining how slavery and segregation shaped perceptions of "the great outdoors"
and excluded people of color from mainstream environmental narratives and environmental
organizations); Paul Mohai & Robin Saha, Which Came First, People or Pollution? Assessing
the Disparate Siting and Post-Siting Demographic Change Hypothesis of Environmental
Injustice, 10 ENV'T RES. LETTERS 115008 (2015) (concluding, based on empirical studies, that
race and poverty are the key variables that explain which neighborhoods have been targeted
for waste disposal and for the location of polluting industry).
13 See Kuehn, supra note 7, at 10699.
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nations (the Global North) and poor and middle-income nations (the Global
South). North-South relations are characterized by distributive injustice
because the wealthiest 20 percent of the world's population consumes
approximately 80 percent of the planet's economic output14  and
simultaneously produces more than 90 percent of its hazardous waste, which
is often exported to the Global South.15  While the affluent reap the
economic benefits of overconsumption, the environmental consequences of
this overconsumption are borne disproportionately by those who contribute
the least to the problem and who possess the fewest resources to protect
themselves against harm, such as vulnerable states, impoverished people,
racial and ethnic minorities, and indigenous populations.16  North-South
relations are also marred by procedural inequities, since the perspectives and
priorities of Northern states drive the decision-making process in
international trade and financial institutions (e.g., the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund [IMF], and the World Trade Organization
[WTO]) while the concerns of poor nations are often disregarded.
17
Corrective injustice is perhaps most apparent in the inability of communities
disparately affected by climate change, such as indigenous peoples and small
island states, to obtain redress for the harms caused by the North's massive
past and ongoing greenhouse gas emissions.is  Finally, North-South
environmental conflicts are embedded in larger social justice struggles,
including the South's resistance to Northern economic policies that
14 See William E. Rees & Laura Westra, When Consumption Does Violence: Can There Be
Sustainability and Environmental Justice in a Resource-Limited World?, in JUST
SUSTAINABILITIES: DEVELOPMENT IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD 99, 110-12 (Julian Agyeman et al.
eds., 2003); WORLD BANK, 2008 WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 4 (2008),
http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/wdi08.pdf.
15 See DAVID N. PELLOW, RESISTING GLOBAL Toxics: TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENrAL JUSTICE 8 (2007); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Beyond Eco-Imperialism: An
Environmental Justice Critique ofFree Trade, 78 DENV. U.L. REv. 979, 991-992 (2001).
16 See Rees & Westra, supra note 14, at 100-03.
17 See RUCmi ANAND, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT JUSTICE: A NORTH-SOUTH
DIMENSION 132-33 (2004); PATRICK HoSSAY, UNSUSTAINABLE: A PRIMER FOR GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 191-98 (2006); RICHARD PEET, UNHOLY TRINITY: THE
IMF, WORLD BANK AND WTO 200-04 (2003).
18 See Maxine Burkett, Climate Reparations, 10 MELB. J. INT'L L.' 509, 513-20 (2009)
(discussing the plight of small island nations); Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and
Environmental Justice: The Impact of Climate Change, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1625, 1633-46
(2007) (discussing the plight of indigenous peoples); Gonzalez, Environmental Justice,
Human Rights, and the Global South, supra note 4, at 187-88 (discussing the difficulty of
obtaining reparations for systemic harms, such as slavery, colonialism, climate change, and
other forms of long-term, widespread environmental damage).
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impoverished the Global South and facilitated the Global North's
appropriation of the planet's resources.19
The discourse of environmental justice has been embraced by social
justice movements in both the Global North and the Global South. These
movements have generated transnational environmental justice networks
dedicated to specific issues including food justice, climate justice, water
justice, and energy justice. Because many biofuel feedstocks can be used
as both food and fuel, biofuels occupy a unique location at the intersection of
energy and food law and policy. In order to evaluate the environmental
justice implications of biofuels, it is essential to understand both climate
justice and food justice.
Climate change is an environmental justice issue. The world's most
affluent populations generate the majority of greenhouse gas emissions
while the consequences are borne disproportionately by vulnerable states
(such as small island states and the least developed countries) that lack the
resources for adaptation and disaster response, as well as by vulnerable
communities (including indigenous peoples, racial and ethnic minorities and
the poor) that lack the resources to protect themselves from floods, droughts,
sea level rises, and other impacts of climate change.2 1 In order to promote
climate justice, it is essential that Northern countries radically reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions, finance climate change mitigation and adaptation
in the Global South, and take responsibility for the harm that their
greenhouse gas emissions have inflicted on vulnerable states and peoples.
22
Access to food is also an important environmental justice issue. The
right to food is a fundamental human right recognized by several legal
instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.23 Chronic
19 See Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and the Global South, supra note
4, at 159-63 (describing the colonial and post-colonial policies and practices that ravaged the
Global South).
20 See generally Martinez-Alier et al., supra note 6.
21 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Energy Poverty and the Environment, in INTERNATIONAL
ENERGY AND POVERTY: THE EMERGING CONTOURS 116-119 (Lakshman Guruswamy ed.,
2016).
22 See id. at 123-124; HENRY SHUE, CLIMATE JUSTICE: VULNERABILITY AND PROTECTION 4-
23 (2014).
23 See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 11 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICESCR];
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undernourishment is a function of poverty rather than food scarcity.
24
Although global food production is sufficient to provide every person on the
planet with approximately 2,700 calories per day,2 5 nearly 800 million
people suffer from chronic undernourishment.26  Ironically, at least 70
percent of the world's undernourished people are small farmers and other
rural dwellers in the Global South.2 7 These small farmers, landless laborers,
fisherfolk, and herders cultivate most of the world's food.28 However, they
experience chronic food insecurity because they lack sufficient land to grow
the food they require and sufficient income to purchase food on the
market.2 9 As explained more fully in Part II of this Article, these farmers
have been relegated to marginal lands and rendered destitute not by accident
or misfortune but by decades of aid, trade, and investment policies that have
placed them in ruinous competition with highly subsidized agricultural
producers in the Global North.30 These rural dwellers are also disparately
threatened by climate change, which will depress agricultural output, ravage
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 24, 27 (Nov. 20, 1989) 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered
into force Feb. 9, 1990).
24 See generally AMARTA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES: AN ESSAY ON ENTITLEMENT AND
DEPRIVATION (1990); see Olivier de Schutter, How Not to Think of Land-Grabbing: Three
Critiques of Large-Scale Investments in Farmland, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 249, 256-57 (2011);
Carmen G. Gonzalez, International Economic Law and the Right to Food, in RETHINKING
FOOD SYSTEMS: STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES, NEW STRATEGIES AND THE LAW 184-85 (Nadia
C.S. Lambek, et al. eds, 2014); Carmen G. Gonzalez, World Poverty and Food Insecurity, 3
PENN ST. J.L. & INT'L AFF. 56, 59 (Feb. 2015).
25 See JEAN ZIEGLER ET AL., THE FIGHT FOR THE RIGHT TO FOOD: LESSONS LEARNED 3
(2011).
26 See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF U.N. (FAO), INT'L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV. (IFAD) &
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP), THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2015:
MEETING THE 2015 INTERNATIONAL HUNGER TARGETS: TAKING STOCK OF UNEVEN PROGRESS
8 tbl.1 (2015), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4646e.pdf.
27 See FAO, IFAD & WFP, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY IN THE WORLD 2014:
STRENGTHENING THE ENABLING ENVIRONMENT FOR FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION 8 tbl. 1
(2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4030e.pdf, IFAD, RURAL POVERTY REPORT 2011 16 (2011),
http://www.ifad.org/rpr20l 1/report/e/rpr201 I.pdf; ACTION GROUP ON EROSION, TECHNOLOGY
& CONCENTRATION (ETC GROUP), WHO WILL FEED US? QUESTIONS FOR THE FOOD AND
CLIMATE CRISES 1 (2009),
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/ETCWhoWillFeedUs.pdf.
28 See de Schutter, supra note 24, at 256-57 (2011); IFAD, supra note 27, at 16; ETC
GROUP, supra note 27, at 1.
29 See de Schutter, supra note 24, at 256; Gonzalez, International Economic Law and the
Right to Food, supra note 24, at 184-85.
30 See infra Part II.
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the world's fisheries, and trigger substantial food price increases.
31
Enhancing the livelihoods of small farmers in the Global South is essential
to the achievement of food justice.
32
Biofuels will promote food justice and climate justice to the extent that
they reduce the Global North's prodigious greenhouse gas emissions and
improve the ability of small farmers in the Global South to obtain access to
healthy and nutritious food.33 An environmental justice analysis of biofuels
requires an examination of the relationship among biofuel policy, climate
change, and the global food system in order to assess the impact of biofuels
cultivation on the environment and on the planet's most food-insecure
communities.
II. BIOFUELS AND THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM
The production and consumption of petroleum and other fossil fuels
exact a heavy toll on human health and the environment, including climate
change, exposure to toxic chemicals, air pollution, and contamination of
lakes, rivers, and oceans.34 Recent studies have concluded that substantial
reserves of oil, coal, and natural gas must remain unexploited in order to
avoid catastrophic disruption of the planet's climate.-35  Theoretically,
biofuels have the potential to mitigate climate change by releasing fewer
greenhouse gases than conventional fossil fuels.36 However, as explained
below, many biofuels actually exacerbate climate change by releasing more
greenhouse gases than the fossil fuels they replace. The following analysis
31 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY, SUMMARY FOR POLICY-MAKERS 6-8, 16-18
(2014); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Climate Change, Food Security, and Agrobiodiversity: Toward
a Just, Resilient, and Sustainable Food System, 22 FORDHAM ENvTL L. REV. 493, 510-12
(2011) (discussing the impact of climate change on food production and the role of large-scale
industrial agriculture in exacerbating climate change).
32 See FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE: INNOVATION IN FAMILY FARMING xvi
(2014), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4040e.pdf.
33 See generally IPCC, supra note 31; Damian Carrington, IPCC Report: World Must
Urgently Switch to Clean Sources of Energy, GUARDIAN (Apr. 12, 1014),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/apr/l2/ipcc-report-world-must-switch-clean-
sources-energy.
34 See, e.g., BRIAN C. BLACK, CRUDE REALITY: PETROLEUM IN WORLD HISTORY 172-81,
217-21 (2012) (discussing some of the environmental consequences of the production,
refining, and consumption of petroleum).
35 See generally Christopher McGlade & Paul Elkins, The Geographical Distribution of
Fossil Fuels Unused When Limiting Global Warming to 20 C, 517 NATURE 187 (2015).
36 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 93.
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explores the relationship among biofuels, climate change, and the features of
the global food system that produce chronic undernourishment.
A. Biofuels and Climate Change
Biofuels are energy sources in liquid or gaseous form that are derived
from biomass.37  Biofuels are categorized as first-, second-, or third-
generation depending upon the feedstocks from which they are produced.
First-generation biofuels are developed from crops that can also be used for
food or feed (including ethanol derived from sugar or corn) and biodiesel
from oilseed crops (such as soybean, sunflower, rapeseed, or palm oil).
38
Second-generation biofuels are made from non-edible crop parts (such as
stems, leaves, and husks), non-food crops cultivated for energy production
(such as jatropha and switchgrass), or waste products (such as municipal
waste and cane bagasse).39  While second-generation biofuels are not
derived from food and feed, some may nevertheless be grown on land that
could be used to cultivate food. Finally, third-generation biofuels (such as
algae-based biofuels) do not compete with food or with land that could be
used for food production.
41
First-generation biofuels represent 99.85 percent of the biofuels42
produced worldwide. Second-generation biofuels have developed more
slowly due to the high capital costs of refining their feedstocks and the
subsidies and other economic incentives that make the cultivation of first-
generation biofuels so lucrative.43  First-generation biofuels will be the
primary focus of this Article because they dominate biofuels markets.
The production and consumption of biofuels will mitigate climate
change if the biofuels emit fewer greenhouse gases than the fossil fuels they
replace. Regrettably, many first-generation biofuels release more
greenhouse gases than fossil fuels due to the unsustainable practices used to
"7 See id. at 15.
38 See Timothy A. Wise & Emily Cole, Mandating Food Insecurity: The Global Impacts of
Rising Biofuel Mandates and Targets 8 (Glob. Dev. & Env't Inst., Working Paper No. 15-0 1,
2015); HIGH LEVEL PANEL OF EXPERTS ON FOOD SECURITY AND NUTRITION OF THE COMMITTEE




42 Id. at 45.
43 WARREN MABEE & JACK SADDLER, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, FROM 1
sT 
TO 2N
GENERATION BIOFUEL TECHNOLOGIES: AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT INDUSTRY AND RD&D
ACTIVITIES 80 (2008).
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produce these biofuels.44  In theory, biofuels should be greenhouse gas
neutral because the carbon dioxide that they release upon combustion is
equivalent to the carbon dioxide that they sequester from the atmosphere
during cultivation.4 5 In practice, however, biofuels may generate even more
greenhouse gas emissions than fossil fuels due to the clearing of forests and
peatlands to plant them, the nitrogen-based fertilizers and petroleum-derived
pesticides applied to the growing crops, the petroleum-guzzling machinery
used to cultivate and harvest them, and the energy required to convert the
plants into fuel.46 Even when land-use impacts (such as deforestation) are
not taken into account, several studies have concluded that corn-based
ethanol (the most commonly used biofuel in the United States) has failed to
significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions and may even emit more
greenhouse gases than gasoline.
47
When researchers include the direct and indirect impacts of biofuels on
land use, many studies conclude that first-generation biofuels are more
damaging to the climate than fossil fuels.48 As one analyst explains:
In order to produce biofuels, cultivators may plough up or bum
forest or grassland, which releases into the atmosphere much of the
carbon previously stored in plants through decomposition or fire.
The loss of maturing forests or grasslands also nullifies future
sequestration gains as biomass grows each year and this lost
potential sequestration ought to be accounted for as a carbon debit.
Farmers may instead choose to divert existing crops into biofuels,
which indirectly causes similar emissions as farmers seek to expand
4 See FAO, THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE: BIOFUELS: PROSPECTS, RISKS AND
OPPORTUNITIES 55-59 (2008), http://www.fao.org/docrep/011/i0100e/i0100e00.htm.
45 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 41.
46 See id.; ROBERT POOL ET AL., THE NEXUS OF BIOFUELS, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND HUMAN
HEALTH: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 2-6 (2014); see generally A. Mosnier et al., Alternative U.S.
Biofuel Mandates and Global GHG Emissions: The Role of Land Use Change, Crop
Management and Yield Growth, 57 ENERGY POL'Y 602 (2013); Jerry M. Melillo, Indirect
Emissions from Biofuels: How Important?, 326 SCIENCE 1397 (2009); JANE EARLEY & ALICE
McKEOWN, SIERRA CLUB & WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, SMART CHOICES FOR BIOFUELS (2009);
Joseph Fargione et al., Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt, 319 SCIENCE 1235
(2008).
47 HLPE, supra note 38, at 50. See also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE (CBO) THE RENEWABLE
FUEL STANDARD: ISSUES FOR 2014 AND BEYOND 3 (2014),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/1 13th-congress-2013-2014/reports/45477-
Biofuels2.pdf; FAO, supra note 444.
48 See UNITED NATIONS ENV'T PROGRAMME (UNEP), TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION
AND USE OF RESOURCES: ASSESSING BIOFUELS 67-68 (2009).
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cropland elsewhere to compensate for losses or to make maximum
gain from increasing prices for increasingly scarce crops.49
Taking land-use changes into account, one study concluded that the
greenhouse gas emissions from U.S. corn-based ethanol are nearly double
those of gasoline over a thirty-year period.50 Similarly, several studies have
found that biodiesel from soybeans and palm oil may produce higher
greenhouse gas emissions than conventional fossil diesel if forests and
peatlands are cleared to cultivate these crops.51 In sum, the climate impacts
of first-generation biofuels vary depending on the type of feedstock used,
how the feedstock is produced, and the direct and indirect land-use changes
resulting therefrom.
52
Despite their questionable contribution to climate change mitigation, the
amount of biofuels produced globally soared from under 20 billion liters in
2001 to more than 100 billion liters in 2011.53 If biofuels are not necessarily
superior to fossil fuels from a climate perspective, then what accounts for
their popularity? The following Section answers this question by explaining
how biofuels are integrated into the global food system and their impact on
the right to food.
B. The Global Food System.- A Food Regime Analysis
The food regime framework developed by Harriet Friedmann and Philip
McMichael is a useful tool for understanding the key features of the global
food system.54 A food regime is a food production and consumption system
49 SMITH, supra note 1, at 51.
50 See Timothy Searchinger et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases
Greenhouse Gases Through Emissions from Land-Use Change, 319 SCIENCE 1238, 1239
(2008).
51 See UNEP, supra note 488, at 53.
52 See Aziz ELBEHRI ET AL., FAO, BIOFUELS AND THE SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGE: A
GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES, TRENDS, AND POLICIES FOR BIoFUELs AND
RELATED FEEDSTOCKS 13 (2013), http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i3l26e/i3126e.pdf.
Although less well-studied and less commercially available, second-generation biofuels also
vary in their environmental impact depending on the feedstock selected and the method of
production. See ANSELM EISENTRAUT, INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, SUSTAINABLE PRODUCTION OF
SECOND-GENERATION BIOFUELS: POTENTIAL AND PERSPECTIVES IN MAJOR ECONOMIES AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (Feb. 2010),
https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/biofuels-exec-summary.pdf.
53 See HLPE, supra note 38, at 55.
5 See generally Harriet Friedmann & Philip McMichael, Agriculture and the State
System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the Present, 29 SOCIOLOGIA
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that advances the interests of one or more dominant powers on a worldwide
scale.
55
The first global food regime (1870-1930s) was dominated by Great
Britain and responded to one of the central challenges of the Industrial
Revolution-namely, how to feed the burgeoning working class whose labor
fueled European industrialization.56 The solution adopted by the British and
later emulated by other European nations was to repeal the legislation that
protected the landed gentry from foreign competition and promote the
importation of cheap food from the colonies.57  Under the guise of
promoting free trade and "civilizing" native peoples, European settlers
forcibly removed farmers in the Global South from the lands they
traditionally cultivated in order to promote large-scale, export-oriented
plantations and commercial forestry.58 The expulsion of subsistence farmers
and the destruction of local institutions that provided social safety nets for
the less fortunate triggered famines in the Global South,5 9 and established a
pattern of rural dispossession in the Global South that would repeat itself on
a larger scale under subsequent food regimes.
60
The first food regime institutionalized the international division of labor
that relegated Asia, Africa, and Latin America to the production of primal,
commodities and the importation of European-manufactured products.
This division of labor remains a central feature of the contemporary
international economic order that has impoverished Southern nations by
exposing them to the volatility of agricultural commodity prices (including
RuRALIs 93 (1989).
55 See Eric Holt-Gimenez & Annie Shattuck, Food Crises, Food Regimes and Food
Movements: Rumblings of Reform or Tides of Transformation?, 38 J. PEASANT STUD. 109,
110(2011).
56 See NORA McKEON, FOOD SECURITY GOVERNANCE: EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES,
REGULATING CORPORATIONS 13 (2015).
57 See Hugh Campbell, Let Us Eat Cake? Historically Reframing the Problem of World
Hunger and Its Purported Solutions, in FOOD SYSTEMS FAILURE: THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS
AND THE FUTURE OF AGRICULTURE 31-32 (Christopher Rosin et al. eds., 2012).
58 See HENRY BERNSTEIN, CLASS DYNAMICS OF AGRARIAN CHANGE 69 (2010).
59 See MIKE DAVIS, LATE VICTORIAN HOLOCAUSTS: EL N!,o FAMINES AND THE MAKING OF
THE THIRD WORLD 8-10 (2002).
60 See notes 67-125, 169-88 infra and corresponding text for a description of rural
dispossession in the Global South caused by Northern agricultural subsidies, the austerity
programs imposed on the Global South by the IMF and the World Bank, free trade
agreements, and the large-scale acquisition of Southern agricultural to cultivate food and
biofuels for export.
61 See BERNSTEIN, supra note 588.
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boom and bust cycles), as well as declining prices for agricultural products
relative to manufactured goods.
62
The second food regime (1930-70s) emerged in response to the two
world wars, the Great Depression, and the Cold War. The United States
dominated this regime and promoted high levels of agricultural
protectionism, agricultural industrialization, and the export of surplus
production to the Global South.63 In response to the Great Depression and
the Dust Bowl, the United States sought to increase domestic agricultural
production by offering generous subsidies to its farmers and by encouraging
mechanization, the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and the
adoption of high-yield crop varieties.64  This capital-intensive, highly
subsidized industrial model of agricultural production was adopted by
Western Europe in the decades following the Second World and generated
huge surpluses of major agricultural commodities in both the United States
and Europe.65 In addition to subsidizing their farmers, the United States and
Western Europe also protected them from foreign competition by imposing
both tariff and non-tariff import barriers on imported agricultural products.
6P
The United States and its Western European allies used their surplus
food production to achieve political and economic ends. They exported the
surplus agricultural commodities resulting from their protectionist policies to
countries in the Global South as food aid in order to strengthen Cold War
alliances with key Southern countries and to create new markets for U.S. and
European agro-exports.67 This food aid, along with the sale of commercial
food at reduced prices, exacerbated poverty and undernourishment in the
Global South by destroying the livelihoods of small farmers who could not
compete with free or cheap imported food products.68 As small farmers
62 See Liz YOUNG, WORLD HUNGER 41-42 (1997); CLIVE PONTNG, A GREEN HISTORY OF
THE WORLD 213-14 (1991).
63 See Campbell, supra note 577, at 34.
64 See id
65 See id at 35.
66 See THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-1992) 141, 155-56
(Terrence P. Stewart ed. 1993); M. Ataman Aksoy, Global Agricultural Trade Policies, in
GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 37 (M. Ataman Aksoy & John
C. Beghin, eds. 2005).
67 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment:
The Neolilberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBLEMS 419, 435-36 (2004); MCKEON, supra note 566, at 15.
68 See JAMES WESSEL, TRADING THE FUTURE: FARM EXPORTS AND THE CONCENTRATION OF
ECONOMIC POWER IN OUR FOOD SYSTEM 166-68 (1983).
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abandoned agricultural production, arable lands in the Global South became
concentrated in the hands of affluent farmers, who cultivated a variety of
agricultural products (such as cocoa, coffee, vegetables, beef, bananas, and
feed grains) for export rather than for domestic consumption.69  The
resulting decline in domestic food production rendered mal0Y of the world's
poorest countries increasingly dependent on imported food.
The United States and Western Europe also used their political and
economic clout to craft trade agreements that benefited the Global North at
the expense of the Global South. The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade71 (1947 GATT) promoted trade liberalization in manufactured
goods, but largely excluded agricultural products.72  The agricultural
subsidies and import barriers maintained by the United States and b y
Western Europe were thus exempted from the international trade regime.
By the mid-1950s, a broad coalition of Southern countries exerted its
numerical majority in the United Nations General Assembly to pass
resolutions demanding greater equity in international economic relations,
including: the elimination of Northern agricultural subsidies and import
barriers, preferential access to Northern markets, and the right of Southern
nations to use tariffs and quotas to protect infant industries from foreign
competition.74  While Southern mobilization produced favorable
amendments to 1947 GATT and yielded side agreements responsive to some
of the demands of Southern nations,75 these reforms were frequently drafted
in non-binding terms and often excluded the products of greatest economic
importance to the South, such as clothing, textiles, and agricultural
products.
76
69 See id. at 167.
70 See JENNIFER CLAPP, FOOD 33 (2011); Harriet Friedmann, From Colonialism to Green
Capitalism: Social Movements and Emergence of Food Regimes, 22 RES. RURAL Soc. & DEV.
227, 242 (2005); Holt-Gimenez & Shattuck, supra note 55 at 110.
71 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Al, A3, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
72 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement on
Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries, 27 CoLuM. J. ENvTL. L. 433, 440-46
(2002).
73 See Faizel Ismail, Rediscovering the Role of Developing Countries in GATT Before the
Doha Round, 1 L. & DEV. R. 50, 58-59 (2008).
74 See id. at 59-67.
71 See id. at 65-67.
76 See YONG-SHK LEE, RECLAIMING DEVELOPMENT IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 107-
10 (2006).
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The United States established the foundation for the third corporate-
dominated food regime during the height of the Cold War. While the second
regime only exported food to the Global South, the third regime also
exported the industrial agricultural model, including machinery, irrigation
new high-yielding seeds, and fossil-fuel-based pesticides and fertilizers. 7
The new food regime was motivated by a combination of humanitarian and
strategic considerations and remains in place today. The humanitarian goal
was to tackle world hunger by increasing food production; the strategic goal
was to contain agrarian unrest that could lead to revolution.78 Known as the
Green Revolution, the industrial agricultural model exported by the Global
North to the Global South increased global food production, but supplanted
ecologically sustainable agricultural practices and fostered dependence on
agricultural inputs manufactured by Northern transnational corporations.
79
The Green Revolution's impact on food security remains hotly
contested. While some scholars argue that the Green Revolution enhanced
food security by enabling food production to outstrip population growth,
others contend that the Green Revolution intensified rural poverty by
favoring affluent farmers who could afford the pesticides, fertilizers,
agricultural machinery, and irrigation systems necessary to produce high80...
yields. When increases in food production caused agricultural commodity
prices to plummet, many8 small farmers experienced severe economic
hardship and dispossession. An influential study evaluating more than 300
published reports on the Green Revolution determined that the Green
Revolution generally increased rural inequality.
82
The chief beneficiaries of the rapid industrialization of Southern
agriculture were the transnational exporters, grain traders, and input
manufacturers in the Global North that received generous government
subsidies, access to new consumer markets in the Global South, and the
opportunity to supply Southern agricultural producers with pesticides,
77 See CLAPP, supra note 70, at 33.
71 See id.
79 See CARY FLOWER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTERING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE Loss OF
GENETIC DIVERSITY 54-79 (1990).
80 See CLAPP, supra note 70, at 38-41; Gonzalez, supra note 67, at 441-43; VANDANA
SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION 176-77 (1991).
81 See SHIVA, supra note 80, at 177; KEITH GRIFFIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
AGRARIAN CHANGE: AN ESSAY ON THE GREEN REVOLUTION 73 (1974).
82 See Donald K. Freebairn, Did the Green Revolution Concentrate Incomes? A
Quantitative Study of Research Reports, 23 WORLD DEV. 265, 277 (1995).
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fertilizers, machinery, and seeds.83  Ironically, agribusiness corporations
were also the primary recipients of agricultural subsidies in both the United
States and the European Union.84 Small farmers were generally harmed by
the rising costs of agricultural inputs and the diminishing prices of
agricultural commodities caused by the global sourcing of agricultural
products by transnational corporations.
The debt crisis of the 1980s further consolidated the third food regime
by adding characteristics uch as free-market ideology, corporate domination
of global food supply chains, and governance of trade policy by the World
Bank, the IMF and the WTO.86 Under the 1947 GATT, Southern countries
retained the authority to protect their farmers from unfair competition with
highly subsidized U.S. and EU agricultural producers by imposing tariffs on
imported food products.87 This regulatory flexibility was sharply curtailed
during the third food regime, which required Southern governments to adopt
a series of neoliberal economic reforms designed to reduce the regulatory
role of the state.
88
Enticed into borrowing large sums of money from the commercial
banks to fund a variety of development projects, many Southern countries
were unable to repay these debts when the oil price shocks of 1973 and
1979-1980 caused energy costs to soar and interest rates to skyrocket.
89
Countries that depended heavily on food imports were particularly affected
because many had incurred huge debts in the early 1970s when rising food
prices coincided with the first oil price shock.90  In order to obtain loan
repayment assistance from the IMF and the World Bank, three-quarters of
Latin American countries and two-thirds of African countries agreed to
adopt a one-size-fits-all package of free-market economic reforms known as
structural adjustment.91
83 See CLAPP, supra note 70, at 32-33; Friedmann, supra note 70, at 243.
84 See SARAH JOSEPH, BLAME IT ON THE WTO? A HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUE 211 (2011);
William S. Eubanks II, A Rotten System: Subsidizing Environmental Degradation and Poor
Public Health with Our Nation's Tax Dollars, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 221-234 (2009)
(explaining that U.S. agricultural subsidies disproportionately benefit agribusiness).
85 See WESSEL, supra note 68, at 23-25.
86 See MCKEON, supra note 56, at 18-20.
87 Gonzalez, World Poverty and Food Insecurity, supra note 23 at 61.
88 See MCKEON, supra note 566, at 17-18.
89 See PEET, supra note 17, at 71-75; SuSAN GEORGE, A FATE WORSE THAN DEBT: THE
WORLD FINANCIAL CRISIS & THE POOR 28-29 (1990).
90 See Friedmann, supra note 70, at 244.
91 See PEET, supra note 17, at 75.
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While Northern states continued to provide massive agricultural
subsidies to their own farmers, the structural adjustment programs of the
IMF and the World Bank imposed austerity and open markets in the Global
South-introducing a double standard that plagues international agricultural
trade to the present day: protectionism for the wealthy and free markets for
the poor. Pursuant to IMF and World Bank loan conditions, Southern
countries adopted a standard package of neoliberal economic reforms that
included eliminating non-tariff import barriers, reducing tariffs, and sharply
curtailing subsidies and other forms of government assistance to farmers
(such as price guarantees, social safety nets, marketing assistance, and
agricultural research and education).
93
Structural adjustment programs devastated rural livelihoods in the
Global South by forcing small farmers to compete with highly subsidized
Northern agricultural producers.94 As cheap imported food glutted local
markets, food production in the Global South declined and millions of
impoverished farmers migrated to urban slums.95 Unable to obtain adequate
housing or employment, many displaced farmers were relegated to low-wage
jobs in the informal sector and hastily constructed dwellings in the urban
periphery.96  Even when farmers remained in the countryside, the
consequences of structural adjustment were dire. In India, for example, over
250,000 farmer suicides since the 1990s have been attributed to the
economic hardships inflicted on poor rural communities by the neoliberal
economic reforms mandated by the IMF and the World Bank (including the
slashing of domestic agricultural subsidies and curtailment of agricultural
import barriers).
97
Structural adjustment programs reduced food self-sufficiency and
increased dependence on food imports in the Global South by dispossessing
small farmers and by requiring Southern countries to dedicate high-quality
92 See Gonzalez, Markets, Monocultures, and Malnutrition, supra note 9, at 364.
93 See MICHAEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY: IMPACTS OF IMF &
WORLD BANK REFORMS 62-63 (1997); JOHN MADELEY, HUNGRY FOR TRADE: How THE POOR
PAY FOR FREE TRADE 77 (2000).
94 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, The Global Food Crisis: Law, Policy, and the Elusive Quest
for Justice, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 462, 469 (2010).
" See id. at 469-70.
96 See VUAY PRASHAD, THE POORER NATIONS: A POSSIBLE HISTORY OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH
272-73 (2012).
97 See CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. & GLOBAL JUST., EVERY THIRTY MINUTES: FARMER SUICIDES,
HUMAN RIGHTS & THE AGRARIAN CRISIS IN INDIA 5-12 (2011), http://chrgj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Farmer-Suicides.pdf.
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agricultural lands to agro-export production in order to service the foreign
debt.98 Many Southern countries shifted from domestic food production to
the cultivation of new agricultural exports (such as fruits, vegetables, and
flowers) in addition to the exports introduced during the first food regime
(such as coffee, cocoa, sugar, and other tropical commodities).
99
The large-scale chemical-intensive production of cash crops also
intensified the environmental damage associated with industrial agriculture,
including soil erosion, loss of crop genetic diversity, depletion of water
sources, and pollution of lakes and rivers.100 Agriculture is one of the most
significant contributors to climate change, responsible for approximately 50
percent of global greenhouse gas emissions.10  While industrial agriculture
is a major greenhouse gas emitter, the small-scale sustainable patterns of
agricultural production that are being displaced by the industrial model are
now recognized as important contributors to climate change mitigation and
adaptation.1
0 2
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), which entered into force in
1995, purported to eliminate the double standards in international
agricultural trade and to "establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural
trading system."10 3  The AoA required WTO members to reduce trade-
distorting agricultural subsidies, convert all import barriers to tariffs, and
reduce these tariffs over time.104 The AoA ultimately failed to achieve its
98 See GEORGE, supra note 89, at 28-29; PEET, supra note 17, at 71.
59 See Friedmann, supra note 70, at 251.
1oo See Anuradha Mittal, U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. (UNCTAD), The 2008 Food Price
Crisis: Rethinking Food Security Policies, G-24 Discussion Paper No. 29, at 13-15, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/GDS/MDP/G24/2009/3 (June 2009); Gonzalez, supra note 67, at 469-70;
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PARTICIPATORY R. INT'L NETWORK (SAPRIN), THE POLICY ROOTS
OF ECONOMIC CRISIS AND POVERTY: A MULTI-COUNTRY PARTICIPATORY ASSESSMENT OF
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 124-26 (Apr. 2002), http://www.saprin.org/SAPRINFindings.pdf.
101 See Rani Molla, How Much of World's Greenhouse-Gas Emissions Come From
Agriculture?, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/numbers/how-much-of-
worlds-greenhouse-gas-emissions-come-from-agriculture- 1782/.
102 Small-scale sustainable agriculture can mitigate climate change by minimizing fossil-
fuel-based inputs and enhancing the ability of soils to sequester carbon. It can also enhance
climate change adaptation by promoting the cultivation of diverse crops and genetic varieties
and improving soil fertility and water retention capacity so as to boost resilience to pests,
floods, and drought. See Gonzalez, supra note 31, at 513-15.
103 Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1995),
pmbl. 2.
104 See Gonzalez, supra note 72 at 450-56.
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subsidy-reduction objectives because Northern countries made aggressive
use of the ambiguities and exemptions in the AoA to continue to subsidize
their agricultural producers and exporters.10 5  For example, Northern
countries maintained high levels of agricultural subsidies by availing
themselves of exemptions in the AoA for subsidies alleged to have minimal
impacts on trade: the so-called blue-box and green-box exemptions.
0 6
Critics charged that these exemptions were inappropriate because the
exempted subsidies had significant trade-distorting impacts that enabled the
North to maintain high levels of domestic protectionism.10 7  Agricultural
subsidies in the North actually increased in the aftermath of the AoA, 108 and
they have remained high ever since.
109
Similarly, the conversion of non-tariff barriers to tariffs did not open up
Northern markets to Southern agro-exports. The AoA did not prescribe a
specific method for converting non-tariff import barriers into tariffs, and as a
result most Northern countries replaced their non-tariff barriers with far
more import-restrictive tariffs.'10 In addition, Northern countries maintained
high tariffs on many Southern products (particularly those that competed
with domestically-produced equivalents) and also engaged in tariff
escalation, which is the practice of charging higher tariffs as the processing
chain advances. 11' Tariff escalation harms Southern countries by preventing
them from climbing the development ladder and producing processed goods,
which can command higher prices than primary products.
Launched in 2001, the Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations
purported to take seriously the concerns of the Global South in the
development of a successor to the current WTO regime. However, North-
'05 See id. at 459-68 (analyzing the ambiguities in the Agreement on Agriculture that
enabled the United States and the European Union to maintain their domestic subsidies and
export subsidies); Joseph. A. McMahon & Melaku Geboye Desta, The Agreement on
Agriculture: Setting the Scene, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AGRICULTURE
AGREEMENT 12-16 (Joseph A. MeMahon & Melaku Geboye Desta eds., 2012) (explaining
why the Agreement on Agriculture's restrictions on domestic subsidies and export subsidies
are easy to circumvent).
106 See JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 186.
107 See id.
108 See Gonzalez, supra note 72 at 366.
109 See JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 186.
110 See Gonzalez, supra note 72 at 458; MELAKU GEBoYE DESTA, THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS 75-76 (2002).
111 See Gonzalez, supra note 72 at 461-62.
112 See id. at 462; JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 187.
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South disputes, particularly over Northern agriculture subsidies, have
impeded its successful conclusion.1 13 In the meantime, numerous bilateral
and regional free trade agreements have gone further than the WTO in
opening up Southern markets to Northern exports without requiring a
corresponding reduction in Northern subsidies. For example, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) among Canada, the United
States, and Mexico obligates the parties to eliminate most agricultural tariffs
by 2004, but does not mandate any reductions in agricultural subsidies
beyond those contained in the GATT or the WTO. 115 Similarly, the EU free
trade agreements with countries in Africa, the Pacific, and the Caribbean
(known as European Partnership Agreements) require substantial reductions
in tariffs while permitting the European Union to continue to subsidize its
farmers. 1
16
The AoA did not create the double standards in international
agricultural trade that systematically disfavor small farmers in the Global
South, but it did reinforce these inequities by failing to reduce Northern
protectionism. These double standards have enabled Northern agricultural
producers to continue destroying rural livelihoods in the Global South by
dumping agricultural products on world markets at prices that are below theS 117 ..
local cost of production. However, the AoA is not the chief impediment
to measures that Southern countries might take to protect small farmers from
unfair competition with cheap imported food products, such as increasing
agricultural tariffs. Most Southern countries have a wide gap between the
low tariffs that they currently apply to imported agricultural products and the
relatively high tariffs that they are permitted to apply pursuant to their AoA
commitments.118  These countries could, in theory, raise tariffs to protect
113 See JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 276-80 (discussing some of the most contentious issues in
the Doha Round of WTO negotiations).
114 See id. at 281-83.
115 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, An Environmental Justice Critique of Comparative
Advantage: Indigenous Peoples, Trade Policy, and the Mexican Neoliberal Economic
Reforms, 32 U. PA. J. INT'L. L. 723, 746-47 (2011).
116 See JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 281-82.
117 SOPHIA MURPHY ET AL., INST. FOR AGRIC. AND TRADE POLICY, WTO AGREEMENT ON
AGRICULTURE: A DECADE OF DUMPING 1 (Feb. 2005),
http://www.iatp.org/files/451_2_48532.pdf; Christian Haberli, The WTO and Food Security:
What's Wrong With the Rules?, in THE CHALLENGE OF FOOD SECURITY 163-64 (Rosemary
Rayfuse & Nicole Weisflet, eds. 2012).
118 See JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 188.
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domestic farmers without running afoul of the AoA. 119  However, many
Southern countries are obligated to maintain low tariffs by regional and
bilateral free trade agreements and by the conditions attached to loans from
the IMF and the World Bank. 12  In order to understand the limited policy
space of many Southern states, it is essential to consider the cumulative
impact of the AoA, regional and bilateral free trade agreements, and the
lending policies of the IMF and the World Bank.
The third food regime transformed many Southern nations that wereS121
once net food exporters into net food importers. Many of these countries
are now being buffeted by soaring food prices.122 In 2008, 2011, and 2013,
food price increases ignited riots in countries as diverse as China, Brazil,
Somalia, India, Yemen, Oman, Argentina, Turkey, Iraq, Bangladesh, Egypt,
Mozambique, Algeria, Syria, Yemen, Haiti, Uganda, Kyrgyzstan, and Saudi
Arabia. 123
Finally, the third food regime enhanced the power of the transnational
corporations that dominate the global food system by redirecting food trade
from national to global markets. These transnational grain traders, seed, and
agrochemical corporations and retail supermarket chains wield
"1 See id.
120 See id. Southern countries could, in theory, challenge Northern agricultural dumping
pursuant to the anti-dumping provisions of the GATT, but the complexity of these rules
makes such challenges difficult. Another option for Southern states is to challenge Northern
agricultural subsidies under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM). Brazil, for example, mounted a successful WTO challenge against U.S. cotton
subsidies. The United States responded by recasting the subsidy schemes to achieve technical
compliance with AoA and SCM requirements. When the U.S. response was found to
contravene its WTO obligations, an arbitrator authorized Brazil to apply countermeasures to
U.S. products. This result bodes ill for Southern countries, most of whom are too poor to be
able to retaliate in a meaningful manner with countermeasures against U.S. imports. See id. at
188-190.




122 See generally NAOMI HOSSAIN, RICHARD KING, & ALEXANDRA KELBERT, INST. OF DEv.
STUDIES & OXFAM INT'L, SQUEEZED: HIGHLIGHTS FROM LIFE IN A TIME OF FOOD PRICE
VOLATILITY, YEAR 1 RESULTS (May 2013),
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/rr-squeezed-food-price-volatility-year-one-
230513-summ-en.pdf.
123 See Nafeez Ahmed, Global Riot Epidemic Due to Demise of Cheap Fossil Fuels,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-
insight/2014/feb/28/global-riots-protests-end-cheap-fossil-fuels-ukraine-venezuela.
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unprecedented market power.124  This market power enables these
companies to pay farmers low prices for their agricultural output, charge
farmers high prices for agricultural inputs (such as seeds and fertilizers),
impose product quality standards that may be too onerous for many small
farmers to satisfy, and overcharge consumers.125 Moreover, as explained
below, these transnational agri-food corporations initiated the biofuels boom
in order to maintain and increase agricultural subsidies and to create new
demand for the resulting glut of agricultural commodities.
C. Agribusiness, Financial Speculation, and the Biofuels Boom
The biofuels boom began with the promotion of corn-based ethanol in
126the United States, by corporate agribusiness. Eager to maintain and
expand government subsidies based on the quantity of corn produced, U.S.
based agri-food corporations developed new and innovative uses for corn,
such as corn-based ethanol, high-fructose corn syrup, and cheap corn filler,
used in a variety of food products.127 After the OPEC oil embargo of the
early 1970s and the subsequent energy crisis, Congress encouraged the
production of corn-based ethanol through new subsidies and tax incentives,
with most of the benefits accruing to large corporations.
128
The rapid increase in biofuels production in the first decade of the 21st
century was likewise driven by government support for corporate
agribusiness.12 9  Despite the questionable climate benefits of the vast
majority of first-generation biofuels,130 both the United States and the
European Union promoted biofuels as part of their energy policies through
subsidies, tax exemptions, and mandates for the blending of biofuels into
transportation fuels. 31
In the United States, the Energy Independence and Security Act of
124 See CLAPP, supra note 70, at 96-118.
125 See id.; JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 198-99; Tristan Feunteun, Cartels and the Right to
Food: An Analysis of States' Duties and Options, 18 J. INT'L ECON. L, 341, 345-54 (2015)
(explaining how agricultural cartels interfere with the right to food).
126 See Melissa Powers, King Corn: Will the Renewable Fuel Standard Eventually End
Corn Ethanol's Reign?, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 678 (2010).
127 See id. at 678-679.
128 See id., at 679-81; Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel, Moonshine to Motorfuel: Tax
Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DuKE ENvTL. L. & POL'Y F. 43, 72-73 (2008).
129 See SMTH, supra note 1, at 67, 69-70, 76-77.
130 See MABEE & SADLER, supra note 43, at 6, 18-19.
131 See HLPE, supra note 388, at 27-32; Wise & Cole, supra note 388, at 14.
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2007132 established Renewable Fuel Standards that require the blending of
36 billion gallons of biofuels into U.S. transportation fuels by 2022.133 The
law does not mandate any assessment of the environmental or human rights
impacts of biofuels either in the United States or abroad.134  The only
environmental requirement is that the biofuels from facilities constructed
after 2007 reduce life cycle greenhouse gas emissions by 20 percent relative
to the life cycle emissions of fossil fuels. 135 While the legislation itself
grandfathers existing corn ethanol producers and exempts them from the 20
percent greenhouse gas reduction requirement, regulations promulgated by
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) extend this exemption to
new corn ethanol producers by concluding, under questionable assumptions,
that most new facilities will meet the 20 percent standard.136 In other words,
the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standards promote the blending of corn-based
ethanol into gasoline even if this may ultimately exacerbate climate change
by increasing greenhouse gas emissions.
137
In the European Union, the 2009 Directive on the Promotion of the Use
of Energy from Renewable Sources (the Renewable Energy Directive)
138
requires that each EU member state derive at least ten percent of its
transportation fuels from biofuels by 2020.139 While the Renewable Energy
Directive does establish sustainability criteria for biofuels,140 these criteria
are purely environmental and do not address the social and human rights
132 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2009).
133 See Powers, supra note 126, at 668.
134 See Jamie Konopacky, Refueling Biofuel Legislation: Incorporating Social
Sustainability Principles to Protect Land Rights, 30 Wis. INT'L L.J., 401, 405 (2012).
135 See 42 U.S.C. §7545(o)(2)(B)(ii) (2009).
136 See Powers, supra note 126, at 672-73, 697-98 (explaining how the statute and
regulations perpetuate the dominance of corn-based ethanol in U.S. transportation fuels); 40
C.F.R. §80.1403 (explaining which facilities are exempt from or presumptively in compliance
with the 20 percent greenhouse gas reduction requirement). After 2022, the EPA
administrator is required to consider several economic and environmental factors in setting
blending volumes, including the impacts of biofuels on air and water quality, wetlands, rural
economic development, job creation, wildlife habitat, and food prices. See 42 U.S.C.
§7545(o)(2)(B) (ii) (I), (V) (2009).
137 See Powers, supra note 126, at 673.
138 Council Directive 2009/28/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 140/16) [hereinafter Renewable Energy
Directive].
139 See Wise & Cole, supra note 38, at 29.
140 See Renewable Energy Directive, supra note 138, art. 17. For example, the directive
prohibits the manufacture of biofuels from land with high biodiversity (such as primary
forest) and from wetlands and peatlands. See id. art. 17(3), (4).
The Environmental Justice Implications of Biofuels
impacts of biofuels, including the impact on the right to food.14 1 However,
in April 2015, in response to concerns about the food security implications
of the diversion of growing amounts of food crops to produce biofuels, the
European Parliament imposed a seven percent cap on the contribution of
food-based biofuels to the EU's biofuel mandate.'
42
Although 64 countries have now adopted biofuel mandates, the United
States and the European Union are the key drivers of biofuel markets,
producing and consuming enormous quantities of biofuels and outsourcing
biofuels production to the Global South in order to comply with their
ambitions mandates.4 3 The United States, the world's largest producer and
consumer of biofuels, accounts for 43 percent of the global production of
biofuels,144 consisting primarily of corn-based ethanol. However, due to
the requirement that a significant percentage of its mandate be fulfilled by
biofuels with lower life cycle greenhouse gas emissions than corn-based
ethanol, the United States will have to import significant amounts of food-
based biofuels (most likely sugar-based ethanol from Brazil) in order to meet
its biofuels target by 2022. The European Union currently uses 65
percent of its vegetable oil to produce biodiesel, imports significant biofuel
feedstocks from the Global South, and will have to increase the level of
imports in order to fulfill its mandate by 2020.147 Indeed, several companies
based in the European Union have acquired lands in African countries to
cultivate biofuel feedstocks for the EU market, and some of these companies
have become embroiled in transactions that deprived local communities of
land needed for food production. 1
48
The rise of biofuels coincides with a new development in the global
141 See Konopacky, supra note 133, at 408. While the Renewable Energy Directive does
establish a special commission to report every two years on the social impacts of biofuel
production both within and beyond the European Union, it does not take affirmative measures
to prevent human rights abuses.
142 See EU Parliament Sets Cap on Crop-Based Biofuels, CLIMATE POL'Y OBSERVER (May
4, 2015), http://climateobserver.org/eu-parliament-sets-cap-crop-based-biofuels/.
143 See Wise & Cole, supra note 38, at 3, 25-30.
144 See id. at 12, 25.
145 See id. at 7.
'46 See id. at 25.
147 See id. at 29-30.
148 See id.; ACTIONAiD INT'L, FUEL FOR THOUGHT: ADDRESSING THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF
EU BIOFUELS POLICIES 20-26 (Apr. 2012),
http://www.actionaidusaorg/sites/files/actionaid/fuel for thought.pdf (describing land
transactions by European companies in Tanzania and Kenya).
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food regime: financial speculation in agricultural commodity markets.
149
After the collapse of the U.S. housing bubble in 2007, many investors
shifted their wealth into agricultural commodity markets, contributing to the
2008 global food price crisis.15 0 In response to the deregulation of "Over
The Counter" (OTC) derivatives (such as commodity index funds) following
the passage of the U.S. Commodity Futures Modernization Act in 2000,
commodity index funds sold by commercial banks became a popular
investment vehicle.15 1 As a small number of commodity traders came to
dominate the agricultural derivatives trade, the global food system became
increasingly vulnerable to price fluctuations based on the decisions of these
traders on behalf of large banks and their clients.1 52  The failure of
governments to adequately regulate investments in agricultural commodities
increased market volatility, posing significant risks to low-income food
purchasers (including small farmers) and to net-food-importing Southern
nations. 153
The success of the biofuels industry is a testament to the power of well-
organized lobbying by powerful corporate interests.154  Agriculture is
generally a poor investment due to the relative inelasticity of food demand
among wealthy consumers, the limited demand among poor consumers in
the Global South, and the oversupply of food on global markets (caused by
Northern agricultural subsidies). However, aggressive government
promotion of the biofuels industry in the United States and the European
Union has enhanced the profitability of newly deregulated agricultural
commodity derivatives by stimulating and guaranteeing new demand for
149 See generally Philip McMichael, Biofuels and the Financialization of the Global Food
System, in FOOD SYSTEMS FAILURES: THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF
AGRICULTURE (Christopher Rosin, Paul Stock, & Hugh Campbell, eds. 2012).
150 See CLAPP, supra note 70, at 141; Peter Wahl, The Role of Speculation in the 2008
Food Price Bubble, in THE GLOBAL FOOD CHALLENGE: TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROACH TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICIES 70-71 (2009); Frederick Kaufman, How
Goldman Sachs Created the Food Crisis, FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/27/how-goldman-sachs-created-the-food-crisis/.
151 See CLAPP, supra note 70, at 139-144; McMichael, supra note 149, at 63; OLIVIER DE
SCHUTTER, FOOD COMMODITIES SPECULATION AND FOOD PRICE CRISES 5-6 (Sept. 2010),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/food/docs/Briefing Note 02 September_2010_EN.pdf;
Nicola Colbran, The Financialisation ofAgricultural Commodity Futures Trading: The 2006-
2008 Global Food Crisis, in THE CHALLENGE OF FOOD SECURITY 173-74 (Rosemary Rayfuse
& Nicole Weisflet, eds. 2012).
152 See CLAPP, supra note 70, at 144.
153 See WAHL, supra note 150, at 75-76.
154 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 77.
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agricultural products.155 Furthermore, the U.S. government's expenditure of
billions of dollars per year to subsidize the production of biofuels has
resulted in handsome profits for agribusiness giants (such as Archer Daniels
Midland Company and Cargill) and for the corporations that invest in
biofuels research (including Shell, ExxonMobil, Dow, Monsanto, DuPont,
and Syngenta).156 Regrettably, environmental protection has provided an
appealing, yet spurious, justification for the transfer of wealth from
taxpayers to agri-food and energy corporations (in the form of subsidies) in
the United States and the European Union. 
157
The biofuels boom has exacerbated market volatility and fueled
speculative investments in Southern agricultural ands.158 The production of
biofuels competes with food production and has contributed to higher food
prices and growing food insecurity. 159 Significant percentages of food crops
are currently being diverted to the production of first-generation biofuels,
and this trend is likely to increase in the maor biofuel-producing countries if
current mandates are fully implemented.16  Countries in the Global North
lack the domestic capacity to fulfill their biofuels mandates, and countries in
the Global South have therefore expanded their biofuels production to meet
this demand.16 1 Indonesia and Malaysia, for example, have expanded oil
palm plantations in order to export to the EU market. Various countries in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America are likewise rapidly investing in biofuels at
the expense of domestic food production.162  The United States and theEuropean Union are anticipated to remain the primary drivers of demand for
155 See McMichael, supra note 149, at 66; SMITH, supra note 1, at 70-71.
156 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 76-78.
157 See id. at 91-94 (discussing the minimal climate benefits of biofuels, the availability of
alternative strategies to address climate change, and the interest groups ("global biofuel
assemblages") that stand to benefit from biofuels mandates and subsidies).
158 See LORENzO COTULA, THE GREAT AFRICAN LAND GRAB? AGRICULTURAL
INVESTMENTS AND THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM 67-70 (2013); HLPE, supra note 38, at 13-15,
55-73.
159 See HLPE, supra note 38 at 13-15, 55-73; see generally KELLY STONE ET AL.,
ACTIONAID INT'L, MANDATING HUNGER: THE IMPACTS OF BIOFUELS MANDATES AND TARGETS
(2015), http://www.actionaidusa.org/sites/files/actionaid/mandatinghunger-report-actionaid-
lores_0.pdf; Another Inconvenient Truth: How Biofuels Policies Are Deepening Poverty and
Accelerating Climate Change (Oxfam, Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 114, June 2008),
http://www.oxfam.org.hk/content/98/content_3535tc.pdf; C. Ford Runge & Benjamin
Senauer, How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 41 (May/June 2007).
160 See Wise & Cole, supra note 388, at 9, 35.
161 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 83; Wise & Cole, supra note 388, at 23, 25-30.
162 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 82-83.
20 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 229 (2016)
first-generation biofuels. 1
63
The expansion of biofuels cultivation to satisfy U.S. and EU demand
has had negative environmental consequences for countries in the Global
South, including polluted and depleted local water supplies and the
exacerbation of climate change through deforestation.164 In Indonesia and
Malaysia, for example, vast tracts of tropical forests and peatlands have been
destroyed and replaced by monocultural oil palm plantations, releasing
greenhouse gases and threatening a variety of species with extinction.165 In
2015, the uncontrolled burning of Indonesian forests to clear land for
pulpwood and palm oil sparked one of the worst environmental disasters of
the year. The fires released more greenhouse gases than Germany's annual
carbon dioxide emissions, blanketed the region (including the neighboring
countries of Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines) in smog
and haze, caused a public health emergency, and threatened countless
wildlife species (including orangutans, leopards, bears, and tigers).166  In
Brazil, the expansion of sugarcane, soy, and animal feed production for
biofuels have contributed to the destruction of the Amazon rainforest as well
as the biodiverse mixture of savannah and woodland known as the
cerrado.167  From the sugarcane fields of Brazil to the cornfields of the
United States, many biofuels also place significant pressure on local soil and
water resources, thereby limiting the water available for local consumption
and food production, contaminating water supplies with pesticides and
163 See Wise & Cole, supra note 388, at 35.
164 See Tokar, supra note 1, at 126; SMITH, supra note 1, at 100; Fargione et al., supra note
466.
165 See Tokar, supra note 1, at 127; SMITH, supra note 1, at 51-52, 102-03.
166 See, e.g., Indonesia Burning: Forest Fires Predicted to Be Worst on Record, GUARDIAN
(Oct. 28, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/oct/28/indonesia-
burning-forest-fires-predicted-to-be-worst-on-record; George Bonbiot, Indonesia Is Burning:
So Why is the World Looking Away, GUARDIAN (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/30/indonesia-fires-disaster-21st-
century-world-media; Matt Osborn et al., Indonesia Forest Fires: How the Year's Worst
Environmental Disaster Unfolded - Interactive, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/ng-interactive/2015/dec/01/indonesia-forest-fires-
how-the-years-worst-environmental-disaster-unfolded-interactive. In addition to demand for
Indonesian palm oil from abroad, the Indonesian government subsidizes palm oil-based
biodiesel for domestic consumption in order to reduce oil imports. See Government Levies
Palm Oil Exports to Fund Biodiesel Push, JAKARTA POST (Apr. 6, 2015),
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/04/06/govt-levies-palm-oil-exports-fund-biodiesel-
push.html.
167 See Tokar, supra note 1, at 127.
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herbicides, and accelerating soil erosion through intensive monocultural
production.168 In sum, biofuels degrade soil and water, exacerbate climate
change, and destroy biodiversity, all of which threaten food production.
In addition to their impact on food prices and on the environment,
biofuels are also triggering an explosion of large-scale leases or purchases of
Southern agricultural lands on terms that may deprive current users and
occupiers of land, water, and other food-producing resources.169 According
to data gathered by the Land Matrix, an independent land monitoring
initiative, the production of biofuels and other export crops has triggered
approximately 38 million hectares of land transfers. Nearly 18 million
additional hectares are under negotiation.170  Africa remains the principal
target of these land grabs.17 1 Indeed, contrary to claims that biofuels will
promote energy security by reducing dependence on petroleum from
conflict-ridden countries in the Middle East, many of the countries targeted
for land-grabbing (e.g., Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo) are notorious for political instability, lack of
168 See id. at 127; SMITH, supra note 1, at 100; See Powers, supra note 126, at 683-84;
ELIZABETH CUSHION, ADRIAN WHITEMAN, AND GERHARD DIETERLE, THE WORLD BANK,
BIOENERGY DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES AND IMPACTS FOR POVERTY AND NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 119 (2010),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/Bioenergy.pdf; OECD & FAO,
OECD-FAO AGRICULTURAL OUTLOOK 2011-2020 88-89 (2011), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/download/5111041 e.pdf'?expires=1457916513&id=id&accname=ocidl
94760&checksum=B68B67D63DEEC 124FCD74246B464B49D.
169 See HLPE, supra note 38 at 77-87; AzIz ELBEHRI ET AL., FAO, BIOFUELS AND THE
SUSTAINABILITY CHALLENGE: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY ISSUES, RRENDS,
AND POLICIES FOR BIOFUELS AND RELATED FEEDSTOCKS 89 (2013),
http://www.fao.org/docrep/017/i3126e/i3126e.pdf. See generally WARD ANSWEEUW ET AL.,
LAND RIGHTS AND THE RUSH FOR LAND: FINDINGS OF THE GLOBAL COMMERCIAL PRESSURES
ON LAND RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim Bending & David Wilson eds., 2012),
http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/ILC%20GSR%20report_
ENG.pdf; LORENZO COTULA, SONJA VERMEULEN, REBECA LEONARD & JAMES KEELEY, FAO,
IIED & IFAD, LAND GRAB OR DEVELOPMENT OPPORTUNITY? AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT
AND INTERNATIONAL LAND DEALS IN AFRICA (2009),
http://www.ifad.org/pub/land/landgrab.pdf; Alexandra Spieldoch & Sophia Murphy,
Agricultural Land Acquisitions: Implications for Food Security and Poverty Alleviation, in
LAND GRAB? THE RACE FOR THE WORLD'S FARM LAND (Michael Kugelman & Susan. L.
Levenstein eds., 2009),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ASIA_090629 Land%20Grabrpt.pdf.
170 See LAND MATRIX, http://landmatrix.org/en/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
171 See ANSWEEUW ET AL., supra note 169, at 23.
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democracy, and weak adherence to the rule of law.
172
Transnational corporations have orchestrated many of these land grabs,
capitalizing on the growing demand for biofuels. Foreign investors
(including Northern investment banks, hedge funds, and pension funds)
speculate on cheap but rapidly appreciating Southern agricultural lands.
Middle-income Southern countries (e.g., China, India, Saudi Arabia, Qatar,
and South Korea) seek to invest in the offshore production of food to offset
price volatility on international food markets and domestic scarcity of fertile
land and irrigation water.173  While most of the land grabs have been
spearheaded by Northern enterprises, certain middle-income Southern
nations (including India, Brazil, South Africa, and China) have come to play
a significant role in the global land rush, sparking significant South-South
tensions. 174
These large-scale land deals threaten the livelihoods of small farmers in
the targeted Southern countries by evicting them from lands traditionally
used for food cultivation, contaminating or depleting the local water supply
through the industrial production of food or biofuel feedstocks for export,
and depriving them of access to grazing lands, fisheries, forests, and other
essential natural resources.175  For example, small farmers and herders
whose traditional ownership or usufruct rights are not recognized by the state
may be evicted or forcibly relocated by government officials, foreign
investors, or local elites seeking to lease or sell these lands to foreign
investors.176  The capital-intensive, export-oriented industrial farms that
supplant small subsistence-based production may diminish local food
availability, exacerbate poverty by reducing rural employment, pollute the
local water supply with pesticide and fertilizer runoff, accelerate soil erosion
172 Chidi Oguamanam, Sustainable Development in the Era of Bioenergy and Agricultural
Land Grab, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH 246 (Shawkat
Alam et al. eds., 2015).
173 See Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 169, at 41-42; ANSWEEUW ET AL., supra note 169,
at 21; CLAPP, supra note 70, at 150-151; Oguamanam, supra note 172, at 237-255.
174 See COTULA, supra note 158, at 55-67; see generally TOMASO FERRANDO,
TRANSNAT'L INST., LAND GRABBING UNDER THE COVER OF LAW: ARE BRICS-SouTH
RELATIONSHIPS ANY DIFFERENT? (2014), https://www.tni.org/files/download/shifting_power-
land.pdf.
175 See Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 169, at 43-48.
176 Raul Q. Montemayor, Overseas Farmland Investments - Boon or Bane for Farmers in
Asia?, in LAND GRAB? THE RACE FOR THE WORLD'S FARM LAND 101-02 (Michael Kugelman
& Susan. L. Levenstein eds., 2009); Olivier De Schutter, The Green Rush: The Global Race
for Farmland and the Rights of Land Users, 52 HARv. INT'L L.J. 501, 537 (2011).
The Environmental Justice Implications of Biofuels
through intensive cultivation, intensify greenhouse gas emissions, and
deprive local communities of water needed for drinking, cooking, bathing,
and irrigation. 177
Local communities often lack legal recourse to prevent dispossession or
to obtain compensation for the loss of lands and livelihoods.178 In Africa,
the epicenter of land grabbing, national laws generally vest ownership of
rural lands in the government or customary chiefs rather than in the
communities that use the land.179  Government officials and local elites
frequently welcome foreign agricultural investment and collaborate with
foreign investors to evict local residents in order to enhance personal wealth
and power. 180 Governments typically negotiate land purchase and lease
agreements behind closed doors without consulting local land users or• • ,181
conducting social and environmental impact assessments. Many of these
contracts contain "stabilization clauses" entitling the foreign investor to
compensation for any economic losses caused by the government's
modification of the legal framework applicable to the investment, thereby
discouraging the state from promulgating new laws and regulations to
protect the local environment and the human rights of its citizens. 
182
These inequities are often compounded by international investment
agreements that protect the assets of foreign investors from government
actions that might diminish their value while providing no redress to local
communities harmed by the actions of foreign investors (such as the right to
bring a claim in the foreign investor's home state).183 Bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) between the host state (where the investment is located) and
the foreign investor's home state typically prohibit direct and indirect
177 Ruth Meinzen-Dick & Helen Markelova, Necessary Nuance: Toward a Code of
Conduct in Foreign Land Deals, in LAND GRAB? THE RACE FOR THE WORLD'S FARM LAND 74
(Michael Kugelman & Susan. L. Levenstein eds., 2009); Montemayor, supra note 176, at
102-105; Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 169, at 46-47.
178 See COTULA, supra note 158, at 99-100.
179 See id. at 27, 86-87, 90-10 1.
180 See LORENzO COTULA, Land Grabbing in the Shadow of the Law: Legal Frameworks
Regulating the Global Land Rush, in THE CHALLENGE OF FOOD SECuURTY 218 (Rosemay
Rayfuse & Nicole Weisflet, eds. 2012).
181 See COTULA, supra note 158, at 112-113.
182 See id. at ll6-117.
183 See Kate Miles, International Investment Law. Origins, Imperialism and
Conceptualizing the Environment, 21 Colo. J. of lNT'L EVNT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 40-44 (2010);
Carmen G. Gonzalez, Bridging the North-South Divide: International Environmental Law in
the Anthropocene, 32 PACE ENVT'L L. REV. 407, 413 (2015).
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expropriation, guarantee fair and equitable treatment of the foreign investor
and the right to export the goods produced, and permit the foreign investor to
bypass the domestic legal system in the event of a dispute by initiating
arbitration proceedings against the host state. 184 These provisions may deter
the host state from enacting labor, health and safety, environmental, and
human rights legislation in order to avoid claims for compensation from
foreign investors for economic losses resulting from this legislation.185 For
example, the fair and equitable treatment obligation requires the host state to
honor the foreign investor's "legitimate expectations" arising from the land
transaction even if these expectations (such as water to irrigate crops) are not
spelled out in the land purchase agreement.186 If the host state reallocates
water rights in order to ensure that area residents have enough water for
drinking, bathing, and small-scale agriculture, the foreign i vestor may be
18T .entitled to financial compensation. Similarly, if the host state responds to
domestic food shortages by restricting the investor's ability to export
agricultural products, the host state may be required to compensate the
foreign investor even if the export restrictions are authorized under the WTO
and other applicable free trade agreements. 
188
Beyond their immediate impact on food-insecure populations, these land
grabs hasten the Global South's transition to large-scale, capital-intensive
industrial agriculture s9 at a time when scientists and policy makers are
increasingly promoting small-scale sustainable agriculture in food-insecure
countries as a means of fulfilling the right to food and addressing climate
change. For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) published a major report in 2013 recommending a
paradigm shift away from industrial agriculture and toward sustainable,
1" See CARIN SMALLER & HOwARD MANN, IISD, A THIRST FOR DISTANT LANDS: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURAL LAND AND WATER 11-13 (2009),
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2009/thirst-for-distantlands.pdf.
185 See Miles, supra note 183, at 40-44.
186 See SMALLER & MANN, supra note 184, at 12; U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Aff.
(UNDESA), Foreign Land Purchases for Agriculture: What Impact on Sustainable
Development? 3 (Sustainable Dev. Innovation Brief No. 8, Jan. 2010),
https://docs.google.com/gview?url=http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/rontent/documents/
no8.pdf&embedded--true.
187 SMALLER& MANN, supra note 184, at 16-17.
188 UNDESA, supra note 186, at4.
189 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 62-63; ASBoJRN EIDE, FAO, THE RIGHT TO FOOD AND THE
IMPACT OF LIQuID BIOFUELS (AGROFUELS) 17-18 (2008) (explaining how biofuels production
favors large-scale plantations).
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regenerative agricultural production systems that enhance the productivity of
small-scale farmers.190 Numerous studies have demonstrated the ability of
sustainable agriculture to increase agricultural yields in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America wfiile improving environmental quality, decreasing
dependence on external inputs, and preserving the traditional agro-ecological
knowledge of small farmers and indigenous communities. 19  Additional
studies have emphasized the ability of sustainable agriculture to enhance
climate change mitigation and adaptation by reducing dependence on
agrochemical and energy inputs, enhancing soil fertility, diversifying plant
species and genetic resources, and increasing the water retention capacity of
soils. 192
In sum, biofuels are not simply an alternative technology designed to
190 See generally UNCTAD, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT REVIEW 2013, WAKE UP BEFORE
IT IS Too LATE: MAKE AGRICULTURE TRULY SUSTAINABLE NOW FOR FOOD SECURITY IN A
CHANGING CLIMATE (2013), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditcted2012d3_en.pdf.
191 See Olivier De Schutter, Report Submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the Right to
Food, 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/16/49 (Dec. 2010),
http://www2.ohchr.orglenglish/issues/food/docs/A-HRC-16-49.pdf, U.N. Conf. Trade & Dev.
& UNEP, Organic Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2007/15 (2008), http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcted200715_en.pdf;
Carolyn Badgley et al., Organic Agriculture and the Global Food Supply, 22 RENEWABLE
AGRIC. & FOOD SYSTEMS 86 (2007); Jules N. Pretty et al., Resource Conserving Agriculture
Increases Yields in Developing Countries, 40 ENVTL Sci. & TECH. 1114 (2006); IFAD, THE
ADOPTION OF ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AMONG SMALL FARMERS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE
CARIBBEAN (2003),
http://www.ifad.org/evaluation/public-html/eksyst/doc/thematic/pl/organic.htm; NICHOLAS
PARROTT & TERRY MARSDEN, THE NEW GREEN REVOLUTION: ORGANIC AND
AGROECOLOGICAL FARMING IN THE SOUTH GREENPEACE ENVIRONMENTAL TRUST (2002); Jules
N. Pretty, Reducing Food Poverty by Increasing Sustainability in Developing Countries, 95
AGRIC. ECOSYSTEMS & ENV'T 217 (2003); Jules N. Pretty & Rachel Hine, The Promising
Spread of Sustainable Agriculture in Asia, 24 NAT. RESOURCES F. 107 (2002); Jules N. Pretty,
Can Sustainable Agriculture Feed Africa? New Evidence on Progress, Processes and
Impacts, 1 ENV'T, DEV., & SUSTAINABILITY 253 (1999).
192 See generally IIED WORKING GROUP ON CLIMATE CHANGE & DEV., OTHER WORLDS
ARE POSSIBLE: HUMAN PROGRESS IN AN AGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 40-42 (2009),
http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/10022IIED.pdf; INT'L TRADE CTR. UNCTAD/WTO & RES. INST.
ORGANIC AGRIC., ORGANIC FARMING AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2007),
http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/Exporters/Sectoral-Information/A
griculturalProducts/OrganicProducts/OrganicFarmingClimate Change.pdf. See also
Miguel A. Altieri & Victor Manuel Toledo, The Agroecological Revolution in Latin America:
Rescuing Nature, Ensuring Food Sovereignty and Empowering Peasants, 38 J. PEASANT
STUD. 587, 596-97 (2011) (discussing the social and environmental benefits of agroecology,
including its ability to foster climate change resilient agricultural systems).
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address climate change. Rather, they represent the perpetuation and
intensification of an industrial model of agricultural production that
threatens the planet's ecosystems, contributes to climate change, and
exacerbates food insecurity in the Global South. The offshore cultivation of
biofuel feedstocks also replicates patterns observed in the manufacturing
sector-namely, the outsourcing of economic activity to the Global South in
order to capitalize on lower labor costs and weak environmental standards
while imposing the social and environmental externalities on vulnerable
local communities.
193
An environmental justice framework provides a morally compelling
language with which to discuss biofuel policy and may offer insights on the
multiplicity of legal strategies necessary to address the problems posed by
bioenergy. Biofuels contribute to distributive injustice because the benefits
are reaped by commercial lenders, financial speculators, oil companies,
agribusiness corporations, and affluent consumers, who can maintain their
car-dependent, energy-intensive lifestyles by simply replacing fossil fuels
with food-based biofuels.194 The costs are borne disproportionately by the
world's most food-insecure populations who confront rising food prices and
eviction from the lands they have traditionally used for farming, foraging,
and grazing. Biofuels are an example of procedural injustice because the
U.S. and EU biofuel mandates are being implemented without an adequate
assessment of their environmental and human rights impacts and without any
input from the communities in the Global South who bear the bulk of these
impacts. Similarly, the large-scale land acquisitions are transpiring without
the free, prior, and informed consent of the affected populations. Biofuel
policies exemplify corrective injustice because the communities deprived of
the right to food (by rising food prices) or evicted from their lands (due to
land grabbing) often have no legal recourse either in the country where they
reside or in other legal fora. Finally, biofuel policies are inextricably
intertwined with larger social justice issues, including an international
economic order that has historically enriched the Global North at the•• 195
expense of nature and of the planet's most vulnerable communities.
193 See McMichael, supra note 149, at 65-67.
194 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 91-92 (discussing the negligible climate benefits of biofuels
and suggesting alternative strategies to reduce the global North's massive greenhouse gas
emissions).
195 See Gonzalez, Environmental Justice, Human Rights and the Global South, supra note
4, at 159-63 (examining the contemporary and historic features of the global economic order
that impoverish the global South and threaten the planet's fragile ecosystems).
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III. LEGAL AND POLICY INTERVENTIONS TO PROMOTE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
A justice-oriented approach to bioenergy must promote the human right
to food, regulate the corporations that dominate the global food system, curb
financial speculation in agricultural commodity markets, and halt land
grabbing. This Section discusses several necessary reforms in order to
mitigate the environmental injustice caused by the bioenergy policies of the
United States and the European Union.
A. The Right to Food
Environmental justice is grounded in human rights, including the
fundamental human right to food.196 The right to food is enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child.197 All states, even those who are not
parties to treaties with binding right-to-food obligations, are required to
protect the right to food pursuant to the UDHR, which is generally regarded
as part of customary international law or as a codification of general
principles of law reflected in national constitutions of a large number of
states and legal systems in the world. 1
98
196 See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Genetically Modified Organisms and Justice: The
International Environmental Justice Implications of Biotechnology, 19 GEO. INT'L ENVT'L L.
REv. 583, 626 (2007).
197 See Universal Declaration, supra note 23; ICESCR, supra note 23; Convention on the
Rights of the Child, supra note 23. While the United States is not a party to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child, it is a signatory to the ICESCR and must therefore act consistently
with the object and purpose of the treaty. See Current Status of Ratifications for the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV-
3&chapter=4&lang--en (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). Furthermore, the United States must
comply with the UDHR, which is widely regarded as a legally binding codification of general
principles of international law, or alternatively as customary international law. See Olivier de
Schutter, A Human Rights Approach to Trade and Investment, Paper Presented at Conference:
Confronting the Global Food Challenge: Finding New Approaches to Trade and Investment
that Support he Right to Food (Nov. 2008), http://www.iatp.org/files/451_2_104504.pdf.
198 See Olivier de Schutter, supra note 197; BERTA E. HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J.
POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW COVENANT LrNKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 56-57 (2009).
See also Smita Narula, The Right to Food: Holding Global Actors Accountable Under
International Law, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 691, 780-791 (2006) (using human rights
treaties, UN resolutions, humanitarian law, multi-state declarations, constitutional provisions,
and jurisprudence in national courts as evidence that the right to food is part of customary
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In General Comment 12, the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights defines the right to food as physical and
economic access at all times to adequate food or the means for its
procurement.199 Comment 12 also explains the duties of states to respect,
protect, and fulfill this right.20 First, states must respect he right to food by
refraining from taking measures that will impede such access.201  For
example, states must consider the impact of their laws and policies (such as
biofuel mandates) on the right to food and modify these laws and policies to
avoid interfering with the ability of communities and individuals to feed
themselves.202 Second, states must protect the right to food by adopting
measures "to ensure that enterprises or individuals do not deprive individuals
of their access to adequate food."' 203  For example, states must adopt
safeguards to prevent local elites and transnational corporations from
depriving vulnerable groups of land and water necessary to grow food and
must prevent the degradation of the ecosystems that support agricultural
production.204 Third, states must fulfill the right to food by providing food
to vulnerable populations "whenever an individual or group is unable, for
reasons beyond their control, to enjoy the right to adequate food by the
means at their disposal."20 5 States must also facilitate the right to food by- . 2 0 6
enhancing the livelihoods of food insecure populations. States can fulfill
these obligations by maintaining robust social safety nets and by using tariff
barriers to protect small farmers from ruinous competition with highly
subsidized food imports from the United States and the European Union.
International human rights law requires states to comply with their
right-to-food obligations not just within their own borders, but also
extraterritorially. This extraterritorial dimension of human rights law is
international law).
199 See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council, Comm. on Econ. Soc. & Cultural Rights (CESCR),
General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11), 6, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/1999/5 (May 12, 1999) [hereinafter General No. Comment 12].
200 See id.
201 Id. 15.
202 See Nadia C. S. Lambek, Respecting and Protecting the Right to Food: When States
Must Get Out of the Kitchen, in RETHINKING FOOD SYSTEMS: STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES, NEW
STRATEGIES AND THE LAW 108 (Nadia C. S. Lambek et al., eds., 2014).
203 General Comment No. 12, supra note 199, 15.
204 See Lambek, supra note 202, at 109-1 10.
20' General Comment No. 12, supra note 199, 15.
206 See Lambek, supra note 202, at 110.
207 See JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 245-64 (discussing the legal and moral arguments in
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particularly important in light of what Penelope Simons calls the
"diminished governance capacity of Third World states, which is the result
of years of intervention by international law and international
institutions."20 8 In other words, as explained in Part II of this Article, the
loan conditions imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, in conjunction
with international trade and investment agreements, have generally
benefitted foreign investors and transnational agri-food corporations, while
restricting the ability of Southern states to comply with their human rights
obligations. Imposing extraterritorial obligations on Northern countries
promotes humans rights by requiring the Global North to modify the aid,
trade, investment, and lending practices that have inflicted enormous harm
on the world's most food insecure populations and have impaired the ability
of Southern states to regulate in the public interest.
209
The extraterritorial nature of human rights obligations is derived, in
part, from the customary international law principles affirmed in the Trail
Smelter Arbitration 2 1 that prohibit states from using their territory in ways
that harm persons or property located in another state.2 11 In addition, Article
favor of the recognition of extraterritorial human rights obligations); Gonzalez, International
Economic Law and the Right to Food, supra note 24, at 168-169; Michael Windfuhr, The
World Food Crisis and the Right to Adequate Food, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS 130-156 (Mark Gibney & Sigrun Skogly, eds., 2010). In
2011, a distinguished group of human rights experts developed a series of principles to clarify
the extraterritorial obligations of states. See generally ETOS CONSORTIUM, MAASTRICHT
PRINCIPLES ON EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN THE AREA OF ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS (Sept. 2011), http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-
navigation/library/maastricht-principles/?tx drblobpi1%5BdownloadUid%5D=23; Oliver de
Schutter et al., Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of
States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 34 HuM. RTS. Q. 1084 (2012).
208 Penelope Simons, International Law's Invisible Hand and the Future of Corporate
Accountabilityfor Violations ofHuman Rights, 3 J. HuM. RTS. & ENV'T 5, 40 (2012).
209 See JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 255-59 (discussing some of the policy reasons for
extraterritorial human rights).
210 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1963-81 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1941).
211 See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note 198, at 287 (discussing the human
rights implications of the Trail Smelter Arbitration). The duty to refrain from causing
transboundary harm was subsequently re-affirmed in Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development and Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration. See U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, princ. 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev. 1 (Vol. I), annex I (Aug. 12, 1992);
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm Declaration, princ. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, ch. 1 (June 16, 1972).
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56 of the Charter of the United Nations imposes affirmative extraterritorial
obligations on all states by requiring all UN members to "take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization" to ensure the
realization of human rights.212 Finally, Article 2(1) of the ICESCR requires
states to "take steps, individually and through international assistance and
cooperation" to progressively realize the rights set forth in the treaty,
including the right to food.213 As General Comment 12 explains:
In the spirit of article 56 of the Charter of the United Nations .....
States parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right
to food in other countries, to protect that right, to facilitate access to
food, and to provide necessary aid when required. States parties
should, in international agreements whenever relevant, ensure that
the right to adequate food is given due attention and consider the
development of further international legal instruments to that end.
214
In order to comply with the right-to-food obligations under international
human rights law, the United States and the European Union should actively
discourage the production and consumption of first- and second-generation
biofuels that compete with food production for land and water, including
biofuels produced from non-food energy crops (such as jatropha and
switchgrass). First, the United States and the European Union should phase
out the subsidies, tax credits, and other incentives that make the production
of these biofuels so lucrative.215 Second, the United States and the European
Union should abolish renewable energy mandates for transportation fuels
until third-generation biofuels that do not compete with food have been
developed, tested, and scrutinized for their environmental and human rights
impacts and have been commercially produced.2 16  The European
Parliament's seven percent limit on the contribution of food-based biofuels
to the EU's renewable fuels mandate is an important first step, but it does
212 U.N. Charter, art. 56, http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/. These obligations
are extraterritorial because they require countries to work together toward the realization of
human rights in their own countries and in other countries.
213 ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 2, 1.
214 General Comment No. 12, supra note 199, 36.
215 The United States has made modest progress in this direction by allowing the tax credit
for corn-based ethanol and biodiesel to expire in 2011. However, other tax credits (such as
those for biodiesel infrastructure) and smaller government agency incentive programs remain
in place. See Wise & Coles, supra note 38, at 14, 25.
216 For a discussion of the promise of algal biofuels and potential environmental
challenges, see generally Heather Hunziker, Finding Promise in Pond Scum: Algal Biofuels,
Regulation, and the Potential for Environmental Problems, 42 TEx. ENVTL. L. J. 59 (2011).
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not go far enough. Third, the United States and the European Union must
devise mechanisms to limit demand for biofuels that interfere with food
production. Even if the subsidies, tax credits, and mandates are eliminated
biofuels will remain attractive if prices for competing fossil fuels rise.
211
The United States and the European Union should devise regulatory barriers
to the expansion of first and second-generation biofuels that threaten food
security, including taxes and outright prohibitions.2 18 Fourth, the United
States and the European Union should invest in research to expedite the
development of third-generation biofuels, such as algae-based biofuels, that
do not make use of land or water that could be used for food production.
Any new technology should be subjected to rigorous environmental and
human rights impact assessments, including assessments of the impacts in
the Global South. These assessments should adopt methodologies that
include input from local populations likely to be affected and should take
into account impacts on food security, land rights, and climate change.
Finally, instead of relying on technological fixes to the climate crisis,
the United States and the European Union should adopt alternative methods
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions in the transportation sector, including
more stringent fuel efficiency standards, reduced speed limits, subsidies and
incentives to promote public transit and car sharing, congestion charges, and.... 219
bicycle-friendly policies. These low-risk, low-impact approaches would
enable affluent countries to take responsibility for their disproportionate
contribution to climate change rather than investing in false solutions
designed to enrich Northern banks, agribusiness corporations, oil companies,
and financial speculators.
Framing biofuel policy in the language of human rights and
environmental justice will enable civil society organizations to name and
shame the governments whose biofuel mandates and subsidies contribute to
chronic undernourishment and dispossession in the Global South. The
language of human rights is morally compelling and has been invoked by
national and transnational food movements to demand a more equitable and
sustainable food system. 22  In order to exert pressure on the United Statesand the European Union to modify their biofuel policies, it is essential to
217 See HLPE, supra note 38, at 62-63 (explaining how changes in fossil fuel prices
influence the production and consumption of biofuels).
218 For a discussion of the legality under the GATT/WTO of human rights-based
restrictions on trade, see JOSEPH, supra note 84, at 91-130.
219 See SMITH, supra note 1, at 91-92.
220 See Gonzalez, supra note 31, at 433-34.
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reframe the debates over biofuels as a matter of social justice rather than a
technical problem to be resolved by scientific experts. While the
recommendations set forth above will alleviate the enormous pressure on
land and water posed by the explosive growth of biofuels, it is important to
recognize that biofuels are deeply embedded in a global food system that
violates the right to food by promoting large-scale industrial agriculture at
the expense of the environment and of the planet's most vulnerable
communities.
In addition to the biofuel-specific recommendations set forth above, the
United States and the European Union should respect he right to food in the
Global South by eliminating the agricultural subsidies that promote
industrial agriculture, distort global food markets, and undermine the
livelihoods of small farmers. The United States and the European Union
should also negotiate, interpret, and apply trade and investment agreements
in ways that provide Southern countries with sufficient flexibility to regulate
in the public interest and to deploy subsidies, tariffs and other import
barriers to protect the environment and to enhance the livelihoods of small
farmers and other food-insecure populations. The United States and the
European Union should protect the right to food by ensuring that third
parties subject to their jurisdiction and control, such as transnational
corporations, do not violate the right to food in other countries through
agricultural export dumping and land grabbing. The United States and the
European Union should also exercise their voting power at the IMF, the
World Bank, and regional development banks to ensure that the policies and
practices of these institutions comply with their right-to-food obligations
instead of imposing devastating austerity programs and impeding the ability
of Southern countries to increase tariffs to protect small farmers from unfair
competition with Northern agribusiness. Finally, the United States and the
European Union should fulfill the right to food by providing food aid in
ways that improve rather than undercut rural livelihoods by, for example,
financing the purchase of such food from local farmers in the Global South
in food-abundant areas instead of deploying food aid as a means of disposing
of surplus Northern production in Southern nations. 22
1
B. Regulating the Corporations that Dominate the Global Food System
One of the greatest obstacles to the realization of the right to food is
221 For a discussion of the specific measures that the United States and the European
Union might take to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to food in the global South, see
Gonzalez, International Economic Law and the Right to Food, supra note 24, at 184-91.
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corporate domination of the global food system. From export dumping to
land grabbing, transnational corporations are significant contributors to
global food insecurity. The governance challenges of Southern states and
the failure of Northern states to regulate the conduct of their transnational
corporations enable these business entities to escape liability for right-to-
food violations. While a complete discussion of the legal strategies that
might be adopted to achieve corporate accountability is beyond the scope of
this Article, possible approaches include enhancing the human rights
enforcement capacity of Southern countries, holding Northern countries
liable for failing to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of their corporations,
strengthening the mechanisms available in the corporation's home state to
adjudicate human rights violations abroad, negotiating treaties that impose
human rights obligations directly on corporations, and mitigating the market
power of transnational corporations through the aggressive use of anti-
competition law.
222
222 For a detailed discussion of these options, see generally Robert McCorquodale &
Penelope Simons, Responsibility Beyond Borders: State Responsibility for Extraterritorial
Violations by Corporations, 70 MODERN LAW REVIEW 598 (2007) (arguing that failure to
regulate the extraterritorial conduct of their corporations may render states liable for the
human rights violations committed by their corporations in other countries); PENELOPE
SIMONS & AUDREY MACKLIN, THE GOVERNANCE GAP: EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND TE HOME STATE ADVANTAGE (2014) (proposing a framework for strengthening
the ability of states to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of their corporations); Gonzalez,
Environmental Justice and International Environmental Law, supra note 4, at 92-95
(discussing a variety of ways to promote corporate accountability for human rights violations,
including enhancing the ability of aggrieved communities to obtain legal redress for human
rights violations); Human Rights Council Res. 26/9, Elaboration of an International Legally
Binding Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Respect to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (July 14, 2014) (proposing to create a
binding treaty to impose human rights obligations on corporations); U.N. CONFERENCE ON
TRADE AND DEV., MODEL LAW ON COMPETITION, U.N. Doc. TD/RBP/CONF.5/7/Rev.3, U.N.
Sales No. E-07.II.D.7 (2007); Feunteun, supra note 125, at 366-81 (discussing how
competition law may be used to help states meet their right-to-food obligations and to
mitigate the power of transnational corporations in the global food system). One of the more
intriguing suggestions is holding states responsible for the human rights violations of their
corporations where a state has actual knowledge of potential human rights violations (caused
by land grabbing or export dumping, for example) and either fails to exercise due diligence to
prevent such violations or enters into trade and investment agreements hat curtail the affected
state's ability to protect the human rights of its citizens. See McCorquodale & Simons, supra
note 222, at 619-23.
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C. Curbing Speculation in Agricultural Commodity Markets
The United States has been slow to regulate the financial services
industry despite the fact that financial speculation in agricultural commodity
markets has increased the volatility of food prices to the detriment of low-
income consumers and Southern nations dependent upon food imports.
22 3
The European Union, by contrast, adopted the Markets in Financial
Instruments Directive (MiFID) in 2007 to regulate speculation in agricultural
commodity markets by imposing position limits and other mechanisms to
curb speculative trading. However, the MiFID has been criticized for
broad exemptions that allow certain groups, such as energy companies,
insurance firms, and pension funds, to evade many of the directive'sS .225
requirements. Since releasing the MiFID, the European Union has sought
to close some of these exemptions and impose additional restrictions on
commodity speculation.2 26 The regulatory options under review include a
tax on financial transactions in order to discourage speculative stock, bond,
and derivative trading.227 However, implementation has been delayed until
2016 due to pressure from the measure's opponents.
228
While a full discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this Article,
223 See TIMOTHY A. WISE & SOPHIA MURPHY, INST. AGRIC. & TRADE POL'Y, RESOLVING
THE FOOD CRISIS: ASSESSING GLOBAL POLICY REFORMS SINCE 2007 30-31 (2012),
http://www.ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/ResolvingFoodCrisis.pdf. Even though the Dodd
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 attempted to curb excessive
speculation on the prices of raw materials and agricultural products, the promulgation of
regulations has been bogged down by the demanding evidentiary standards imposed by the
courts on financial rule-making. See generally Leslie Josephs, CFTC Nears New Rules to
Curb Excessive Speculation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/cftc-
nears-new-rules-to-curb-excessive-speculation-1421964452; James W. Williams, Dodging
Dodd-Frank: Excessive Speculation, Commodities Markets, and the Burden of Proof 37 L. &
POL'Y 119 (2015); Ben Geier, Four Years on, Dodd-Frank Is Still Unfinished, FORTUNE (July
21, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/07/2 1/four-years-on-dodd-frank-is-still-unfinished/.
224 See generally Umberto Marengo, The Effects of the Financial Crisis on EU Financial
Regulation for Commodities, REV. OF ENV'T, ENERGY & ECON. (May 14, 2015),
http://dx.doi.org/10.7711/feemre3.2015.05.002.
225 See DIEGO VALtANTE & KAREL LANNOO, CTR. EUR. POL'Y STUD., MIFID 2.0: CASTING
NEW LIGHT ON EUROPE'S CAPITAL MARKETS 123 n. 170 (2011).
226 Jonathan Herbst et al., MiFID Review: Commodities, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT (Oct.
2011), http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/57724/mifid-review-
commodities.
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the United States and the European Union might consider the policy
recommendations put forth by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). These recommendations include increasing
transparency in physical markets, commodity futures exchanges, and over-
the-counter markets; tightening regulations on financial investors (such as
position limits); introducing a transaction tax system; and creating
mechanisms to deal with speculative bubbles. 229 Above all, it is essential
for the United States and the European Union to coordinate their policies and
to promote the adoption of these measures on a worldwide basis.
D. Reforming International Investment Law
International investment law has facilitated the land grabs that currently
threaten small farmers in the Global South. Investment agreements between
the host state and the foreign investor's home state often compound the
weaknesses in national laws that enable governments and local elites to sell
or lease large tracts of land to foreign investors for the offshore production
of food and biofuels without consulting with local communities or taking
into account their customary land rights. Grassroots demands for the
return of contested lands to the affected communities could conflict with
investment treaty obligations requiring states to protect the rights of foreign
investors. 231 Government efforts to protect the water rights of local
communities or to adopt more robust environmental and human rights
impact assessments could be challenged by foreign investors as breaches of
the expropriation clauses and fair and equitable dealing clauses of
investment agreements.2 32 States may be required to compensate foreign
investors or go through expensive and time-consuming arbitration
proceedings to defend themselves against investor claims if they attempt to
resist land grabbing and protect the rights of local communities.
233
The crux of the problem is that model investment agreements developed
by capital-exporting countries restrict the regulatory authority of host states
to protect the rights and livelihoods of their citizens while imposing no
corresponding obligations on foreign investors to comply with human rights
229 See Don't Blame the Physical Markets: Financialization is the Root Cause of Oil and
Commodity Price Volatility 4 (UNCTAD, Policy Brief No. 25, Sept. 2012).
230 See LORENZO COTULA, INT'L INST. FOR ENV'T AND DEV., LAND RIGHTS AND
INVESTMENT TREATIES: EXPLORING THE INTERFACE 27-29 (2015).
231 See id. at 29.
232 See id. at 30.
233 See id. at 31, 36.
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and environmental standards. These model investment agreements also
provide no means for host states to raise such non-compliance as a
counterclaim in arbitration proceedings.234  Instead of perpetuating
international investment law's single-minded focus on protecting the
interests of investors and capital-exporting countries, the United States and
the European Union should develop model agreements that better balance
investor rights and responsibilities and provide host countries with greater
policy space to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to food. A useful
template is the Model International Agreement on Investment for
Sustainable Developed created by the International Institute for Sustainable
Development.
235
E. .Moratorium on Land Grabbing
Governments and international organizations have proposed a variety of
legal frameworks to regulate land grabbing. Perhaps the most well-known
framework is the World Bank's proposed Principles for Responsible
Agricultural Investment (PRAI).236 This framework, like other codes of
conduct favored by mainstream development organizations, generally treats
these large land transactions as economic development opportunities and
seeks to maximize their potential benefits by promoting respect for existing
land rights, enhancing transparency and community consultation, and using
the employment, technology transfer, infrastructure development, and agro-
export opportunities created by these investments to increase rural incomes
and combat poverty.2 37  By contrast, many civil society organizations
(including farmers' movements, human rights organizations, and local and
indigenous communities) oppose these investments on the ground that the
large-scale industrial agricultural model advanced by these land deals
dispossesses mall farmers, degrades the environment, and exacerbates food
insecurity.238 As one observer points out:
234 See Simons, supra note 208, at 18.
235 See HOwARD MANN ET AL., INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., IISD MODEL
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON INVESTMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Apr. 2005),
https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investmentmodel-int_agreement.pdf.
236 See The Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment (PRAI), U.N. CONF. ON
TRADE AND DEV., http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/G-20/PRAI.aspx (last visited Mar. 13,
2016). This proposal is also sponsored by UNCTAD, FAO, and IFAD.
237 See id.; Oguamanam, supra note 172, at 252-53.
238 See generally Saturnino M. Borras, Jennifer Franco & Chunyu Wang, The Challenge of
Global Governance of Land Grabbing: Changing International Agricultural Context and
Competing Political Views and Strategies, 10 GLOBALIZATION 161 (2013).
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[F]ull compliance with the PRAI principles is unlikely to produce
positive outcomes for the poor and will, at best, entrench the pre-
existing inequitable status quo. For example, securing "existing"
land rights does not benefit landless peasants and future generations.
Ensuring participatory and transparent land acquisition processes
will make no difference if power relations remain asymmetrical. The
same is true of social and environmental impact assessments,
regardless of their outcomes .... Simply stated, the PRAI reflects an
attempt to preserve the interests of capital, facilitate land acquisition,
and sustain an agro-industrial model with marginal regard to
complex environmental, economic, and social relations that sustain
the livelihoods and culture of local and indigenous farming
communities.
239
In addition to these concerns, the PRAI is, in the end, a form of industry,. 240
self-regulation with no sanctions for non-compliance. Instead of
addressing land grabbing on an ad-hoc, project-by-project basis governed by
a set of non-binding principles, countries in the Global North and the Global
South should collaborate to impose a moratorium on these large-scale land
transactions in order to allow host governments, home governments, civil
society, and international institutions to develop more effective norms and
oversight mechanisms.
CONCLUSION
Northern biofuel laws and policies have violated the right to food of
some of the world's poorest people by increasing food prices and triggering
large-scale land acquisitions that deprive local communities of access to
land, water, and food. Biofuels represent the intensification of an industrial
model of agricultural production that destroys local ecosystems, contribute
to climate change, and exacerbate food insecurity. Ironically, the life cycle
greenhouse gas emissions of many biofuels exceed those of the fossil fuels
they replace. Biofuels also reinforce car-dependent, energy-driven lifestyles
that perpetuate climate change and forestall more enlightened policies to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the transportation sector. As one
observer candidly acknowledges:
[W]e are transferring... the risks of climate change, and of
mitigation on to the poorest people in the most vulnerable parts of
the world. We are, in effect, expecting the rural poor in the
239 Oguamanam, supra note 172, at 254.
240 id.
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developing world to alter their land-use patterns [and] their
livelihoods ... in order that we may maintain our consumption and
241energy-use patterns for as long as possible.
An environmental justice framework reveals the complex ways that
food and climate policies intersect to inflict violence on the environment and
on the planet's most vulnerable human beings. An environmental justice
analysis creates a morally persuasive narrative grounded in justice and ethics
that demonstrates why these policies must change.
In order to promote environmental justice and comply with their right-
to-food obligations, the United States and the European Union should
reduce, and eventually eliminate the subsidies, tax incentives, and mandates
that have fostered the explosive growth of food-based biofuels. In addition,
they should affirmatively erect regulatory barriers to the expansion of first-
and second-generation biofuels that compete with food production. Finally,
the United States and the European Union should address the regulatory
gaps and failures that have fueled financial speculation in agricultural
commodity markets, land grabbing, and the quasi-monopolistic power of
transnational corporations in the global food system.
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